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Abstract
Despite the huge evidence documenting the adverse impact of extractive policies, we
still lack a framework that identifies their determinants. Here, we lay out a two-region,
two-social class model for thinking about this issue, and we exploit its implications to
propose a novel account of the present-day economic divide between North and South
of Italy. In contrast with the extant literature, we document that its opening is the
result of the region-specific policies selected between 1861 and 1911 by the elite of the
Kingdom of Sardinia, which annexed the rest of Italy in 1861. To elaborate, pre-unitary
regional revenues from land property taxes per capita and railway diffusion are only
driven by the contemporaneous region’s farming productivity but not by the region’s
political relevance for the Kingdom of Sardinia’s elite, whereas the opposite is true for
the post-unitary ones. Moreover, tax-collection costs, the regional political relevance,
and tax distortions shaped the growing North-South gap in post-unitary development,
culture, and literacy. Crucially, our framework clarifies the incentives of dominating
groups in other political and economic unions, e.g., post-Civil War USA and EU.
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1 Introduction
Despite the huge evidence documenting that extractive institutions and policies can limit
the access to rents discouraging in turn innovation (North et al., 2009) and can undermine
both property rights protection and contract enforcement (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012),
we still lack a framework that identifies their determinants. Here, we lay out a two-region,
two-social class model for thinking about this issue, and we exploit its implications to propose
a novel account of the present-day economic divide between North and South of Italy.1 A
well-known literature has traced back this gap to the diverse political trajectories followed by
the two clusters during the Middle Ages (Putnam et al., 1993). In particular, the experience
of more inclusive political institutions—i.e., the communes—would have helped northern
Italy develop a stronger culture of cooperation easing the functioning of formal institutions
(Guiso et al., 2016). Recent contributions however have raised several doubts on this slant.
First, Boranbay and Guerriero (2016) show that the main driver of present-day culture in
Europe has been the medieval need of sharing climate-driven consumption risks rather than
past political institutions and that, up to the 17th century, the two parts of Italy did not
display significant cultural differences. Second, a growing body of research reveals that, at
Unification, the two groups also fared similarly well in terms of development (Ciccarelli and
Fenoaltea, 2013). Inspired by this evidence, we document that the opening of the present-
day divide is the result of the region-specific policies selected between 1861 and 1911 by the
elite of the Kingdom of Sardinia, which annexed the rest of Italy in 1861. These penalized
more the regions farther away from the capital of the foreign power most adverse to the
Kingdom of Sardinia and thus less politically salient for its elite.
In the model, we consider two regions, which are first independent and then unified by
a completely unforeseen shock similar to the one that originated the unitary state. The
northern region represents the Kingdom of Sardinia, whereas the southern one stands for
any of the other states annexed by the Kingdom of Italy in 1861. Each region is inhabited
by a mass zero elite and a mass one citizenry, who consumes the untaxed supply of a private
1To elaborate, in 2008 southern Italy displayed a 9 percent lower share of respondents to the European
Value Study reporting “tolerance and respect for other people” as important qualities children should be
encouraged to learn and a 40 percent lower income per capita than northern Italy (Iuzzolino et al., 2011).
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good and a region-specific public good whose production is financed through the tax revenues
not appropriated by the elite. The private good technology is multiplicative in the region-
specific productivity and the citizenry’s investment in an input that can be seen as either
a culture of cooperation or human capital. The first interpretation links directly our setup
to the extant literature on the medieval determinants of the present-day divide. Under
autarky, each elite selects her region’s tax rate by maximizing the sum of rents net of linear
tax-collection costs and the citizenry’s welfare. Thus, equilibrium tax revenues fall with the
marginal tax-collection costs and, because these are sizable, with the taxable value and thus
the regional productivity. Under political union instead, both region-specific tax rates are
selected by the northern elite, who is less concerned with the southern citizenry’s welfare and
appropriates from the South relatively more than the southern elite can under autarky. In
particular, the extractive power of the northern elite is sufficiently strong to make taxation
of the South profitable at the margin. These assumptions are consistent with the fact that,
initially, the unitary state exercised a close control on the annexed regions and was dominated
by the elite of the Kingdom of Sardinia, who in turn was chiefly interested in fortifying the
northern industry. The mix between stronger extractive capacity and her limited concerns
with the South leads the northern elite to raise from this region tax revenues rising with the
South’s productivity and falling with both the marginal tax-collection costs and the South’s
political relevance, i.e., the weight the northern elite attaches to the southern citizenry’s
welfare. In addition, extraction from the South is larger than under autarky, provided that
the South’s technology is not too backward, and pushes the southern citizenry to prefer
private to public good production. Hence, the southern citizenry’s investment and welfare
rise with the factors limiting taxation, like the marginal tax-collection costs and the political
relevance, and Unification damages the South when it is not sufficiently salient for the North.
To test these predictions, we analyze data for the 1801-1911 period from the thirteen
present-day Italian regions incorporated by the Kingdom of Italy before World War I but
not part of the Kingdom of Sardinia. Being the Italian economy essentially agrarian at
the time, we proxy the extent of extraction with the land property taxation. In default
of sufficient information on pre-unitary fiscal legislation and given the peculiar features of
post-unitary taxation however, we cannot study directly tax rates, and thus we focus on
3
the revenues from land property taxes per capita. These taxes have been region-specific
over the whole sample and, absent developed financial markets, dramatically shaped the
landowners’ capacity to invest in new farming technologies and the industry. Turning to
the regional productivity, we rely upon the geographic drivers of the profitability of market-
oriented farming, i.e., arboriculture and sericulture. Next, we use as inverse metrics of the
marginal tax-collection costs a measure of fiscal capacity, i.e., the share of previous decade in
which the state to which the region belonged partook in external wars. Finally, we propose
as an inverse proxy for military saliency and in turn political relevance the distance of each
region’s main city from the capital of the foreign power most adverse to the House of Savoy.
Consistent with our model, pre-unitary land property tax revenues per capita are only
explained by the contemporaneous region’s farming productivity but not by the region’s
political relevance, whereas the opposite is true for the post-unitary ones. Moreover, tax-
collection costs, the regional political relevance, and tax distortions shaped the growing
North-South gap in post-unitary development, culture, and human capital. We gauge tax
distortions with the difference between the land property tax revenues per capita observed in
the region and those that would have prevailed without Unification and forecasted through
pre-unitary estimates. This choice is justified by the inefficiency of post-unitary public good
provision in the South as predicted by our model and confirmed by the historical evidence
we discuss. Even if our proxies for the determinants of extraction are all driven by either
geographic features independent of human effort or events outside the control of the elites
selecting tax policies, our results could still be produced by unobserved heterogeneity. To
evaluate this issue, we follow a two-step strategy. First, we control not only for fixed region
effects, but also for energy endowment, population density, income inequality, wages, and
medieval political institutions. Including these controls has little effect on our results. Sec-
ond, we use insights from Altonji et al. (2005) to assess how much greater the influence of
unobservables would need to be, relative to observables, to explain away the relationships
we uncover in the data. We find that it would have to be on average about 16 times greater
than the influence of observables. Given the high fit of our regressions, it is then unlikely
that the estimates can be attributed to unobservables. Finally, to show that post-unitary
tax distortions cannot be considered the acceptable price for the northern industrialization,
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we document that the pre-unitary railway diffusion was mainly driven by the farming pro-
ductivity, whereas the post-unitary one was only shaped by the region’s political relevance.
Albeit a long literature has related the present-day divide to post-unitary policies (Daniele
and Malanima, 2014), no other work has provided a framework clarifying how these policies
solved the unitary government’s trade-off between extraction-related losses—i.e., investment
distortions, tax-collection costs, and military weakness—and rent-seeking gains.2 In this
respect, our paper contributes to the aforementioned literature contrasting “extractive” and
“inclusive” institutions by endogenizing the extent of extraction in a setup sufficiently general
to be applied to other crucial instances.3 The post-Civil War gap between northern and
southern US regions is a case in point contemporaneous to the natural historical experiment
we focus on, whereas more recent examples are the German opposition to the post-2011 rescue
packages demanded by Greece (Guiso et al., 2015) and the tensions between the Basque
Country (northern Ireland) and the Spanish (UK) government (Abadie and Gardeazabal,
2003; Besley and Mueller, 2012). To confirm this point, we look at the post-Civil War US
case, and we provide evidence that the growing divide between the Confederate states and
the territories that sustained the Union was correlated with the differences in the tax burden
imposed on them by the federal government, which was initially dominated by the ex-Union.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we review some key facts about 19th century
Italy to motivate our model, which we illustrate in section 3. In section 4 then, we state the
model empirical implications, which we test in section 5. Finally, we present our conclusions
in section 6, and we gather both tables and figures in the appendix.
2 Italy Before and After the Unification: A Primer
Next, we describe the political and economic contexts of the Italian regions over the
1801-1911 period, detailing at the same time the main innovations in tax policies.
2.1 The Era of Risorgimento
The Congress of Vienna divided Italy in eight absolutists states: the northwestern King-
2By studying the determinants of regional tax policies and public spending, we also contribute to the literature
on public goods, internal and external conflicts, and the size of nations (Alesina and Spolaore, 2005).
3Felice (2014) points at the extractive habits of the southern elite as main driver of the present-day divide.
However, this mechanism is completely irrelevant to explain post-unitary outcomes (see section 5.4.1).
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dom of Sardinia ruled by the Piedmontese House of Savoy; the northeastern Kingdom of
Lombardy-Venetia under the direct control of Austria; the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and
the Duchies of Modena and Parma, all in the hands of branches of the Austrian Habsburg
dynasty; the Duchy of Lucca then absorbed by Tuscany in 1847; the Papal State; and the
southern Kingdom of the Two Sicilies ruled by the Bourbons.4 This division re-established
the status quo preceding the Napoleonic conquests and served two key purposes. First, it
deprived the Bourbons of any interest in waging war being their only neighbor the Pope,
who in turn was constrained by his religious role. Second, it kept in check Austria and
France by establishing the Kingdom of Sardinia as a buffer state between the two powers.
Exactly this threat-based balance fed the ambitions of the House of Savoy who soon became
the champion of the Italian liberals, who longed to establish a unitary state. Supported by
urban workers and lower military ranks, the liberals organized a series of subversive acts in
the wake of the unrests of 1820, 1830, and 1848. Crucially, even if none of them overthrew
a pre-unitary regime, these turmoils forced the absolutist rulers to implement some of the
liberal laws brought about by the Napoleonic armies and inspired by the French revolution.
This institutional discontinuity involved the whole peninsula but was particularly rel-
evant for the southern population, who could finally see realized the reforms introduced
during the French seizure, i.e., the privatization of one third of the clerical and common
lands, initially implemented in 1792, and the end of the feudal system declared in 1806. The
liberalization surge did not release the Italian peasants from their destitution but allowed a
rising class of bourgeoisie to acquire part of the nester nobility’s domains and prioritize in
these estates market-oriented activities, like arboriculture and sericulture, over subsistence
farming, i.e., wheat breeding (Pescosolido, 2011). Both enterprises were significantly more
lucrative than wheat breeding,5 but also more capital intensive. Silk is obtained from the
fibers extracted from the cocoons of the larvae of the mulberry silkworm dissolved in boiling
water. The fibers were spun through reels powered by watermills (Britannica, 2014). Such
a need of water favored the concentration of sericulture in the irrigated Po valley. Over
and above irrigation ditches assuring a continuous supply of water, citrus and olive trees
4Our historical account is based on Hearder (1983), Killinger (2002), Riall (2009), and Galasso (2011).
5They were about sixty times more profitable than subsistence farming (see Dimico et al., [2012]).
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need several years before producing and a temperature above 4 Celsius degrees (Britannica,
2014). This last feature explains their almost exclusive diffusion in the South (Dimico et
al., 2012). Farming productivity increased in both the sharecropping-based northern farms
and the southern latifundia, which displayed a net technological primacy over the 19th cen-
tury (Federico, 2007). By assuring training, job security, and credit line to their employees,
the “latifondisti” indeed could invest in a more peaceful setting (Petrusewicz, 1996). This
productivity gap was widened by the 1850s epidemic of Pebrine, which halved the silkworm
population. Table 2 summarizes these regional differences using our proxies for farming
productivity and differentiating the thirteen regions analyzed in our empirical exercise ac-
cording to their political relevance for the Piedmontese elite, as inversely measured by the
distance of each region’s main city from the capital of the foreign power most adverse to
the House of Savoy, i.e., Distance-to-Enemies (see for each variable sources and construc-
tion table 1). To illustrate, Veneto displays the lowest average value of Distance-to-Enemies
being the only region bordering either Austria or France, and thus we treat it as the “high”
political relevance cluster. Similarly, we label the other regions with below-average values
of Distance-to-Enemies—i.e., Abruzzi, Emilia Romagna, Lombardy, Marche, Tuscany, and
Umbria—the “middle” political relevance group and the remainder—i.e., Apulia, Basilicata,
Calabria, Campania, Lazio, and Sicily—the “low” political relevance group. We also refer to
the latter as “South” and to the union of the former and the middle political relevance group
as “North.” As table 2 reveals, the South remained over the 19th century moderately inferior
in the sericulture and wheat breeding sectors but greatly superior in the arboriculture one.
After two centuries and half of economic decline, the Italian population started to grow
again doubling over the 1800-1860 period (Malanima, 2011). In absence of a proper industrial
revolution however, the GDP per capita stagnated until the 1870s against a background
of regional differences (Pescosolido, 2011). To illustrate, the South maintained a slight
preponderance for all the pre-unitary period (see table 2). These differences however were
negligible compared to the backwardness of Italy in comparison with the European powers. In
1861 indeed, 68 (only 3) percent of the active population was employed (worked exclusively)
in the agricultural (industrial) sectors, and both the iron production and the number of
spindles were less than 1 percent of the English levels (Pescosolido, 2011). The causes of this
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gap were the scarcity of coal and the paucity of both human and real capital with the second
aspect manifesting regional dissimilarities (Pescosolido, 2011). While indeed the northern
credit markets were slowly becoming diversified with both small institutes—i.e., “casse di
risparmio”—and medium-sized commercial banks, the southern ones were still dominated by
the micro-credit institutions appeared from the 15th century on (Felice, 2014). In addition,
the 1861 share of illiterates aged over six was significantly larger in the South (Svimez, 2011).
Differences in capital accumulation however mainly reflected dissimilarities in public poli-
cies (Dincecco et al., 2011). On the one hand, the 1848 defeat in the Austro-Sardinian War
forced Carlo Alberto of Savoy to abdicate in favor of his son Vittorio Emanuele II, who
upheld a liberal constitution to calm down the internal uprisings and gain support for his
territorial ambitions. This reform allowed the rising liberal class to obtain investments in
railway and other valued public goods, like literacy, and the king to levy the taxes necessary
to finance military purposes. Similarly, Vienna tried and succeeded to avoid unrests by ap-
peasing local elites but did so combining higher nonmilitary expenditures to artificially low
tax rates. On the other hand instead, the fierce domestic unrests of 1820 and 1848 failed
to produce in the Kingdom of Two Sicilies an enduring institutional reform but induced a
sizable rise in military spending, which because of the population’s aversion to any tax rise
irreparably squeezed nonmilitary expenditures. A similar aversion to novel duties, together
with less ferocious internal conflicts, kept both taxation and spending low in the Papal State
and the northern Duchies. These regional asymmetries are clearly depicted in the upper-left
and upper-right graphs in figure 1. While the former reports, in default of sufficient infor-
mation on the tax rates,6 the revenues from land property taxes in 1861 lire per capita, the
latter displays the decennial change in the railway network per square km. Land property
taxes, which constituted the largest direct tax and hit the rent estimated by one of the 22
existing cadastres,7 remained up to the 1850s larger in the South, whereas investments in
railway diffusion, which represented the largest nonmilitary expenditure, were trifle before
1840 and barely higher in the North at Unification. All in all, dissimilarities in fiscal capacity
and public spending across pre-unitary states endowed the northern regions with a larger
6To the best of our knowledge, only information on the 1860 is available (see Parravicini, [1958]).
7Dating back to the early 18th century, they were based on either geometrical or descriptive data and directed
at measuring the market value of either the land or its product (Parravicini, 1958).
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human and real capital, but did not determine sizable differences in development.
2.2 Italian Unification and the Rise of the North-South Divide
Meanwhile, the power of the Kingdom of Sardinia’s parliament relative to the king grew
steadily. Its leader became count Camillo of Cavour, who was appointed prime minister in
1852. He realized that the Savoys could not fight Austria alone and, thus, sustained France
in the Crimean War (1853-1856) to win the favor of Napoleon III. This attempt was such a
success that the Kingdom of Sardinia and France first signed a secret pact against Austria
and then defeated its military in Lombardy in 1859. This victory triggered insurrections in
Tuscany, Giuseppe Garibaldi’s conquest of the South, and the invasion of the Papal State. A
unitary Kingdom of Italy was proclaimed on March 17th 1861. Over and above the conquest
of the Venetian (1866) and Roman provinces (1870), the desire of getting the northern
industry off the ground was the key objective of the first unitary executives (Pescosolido,
2011). Dominated by the Piedmontese elite, who provided before 1873 the 73 percent of the
prime ministers and the 35 percent of the executive (see Corbetta and Piretti [2008] and
the bottom-left graph in figure 1), these governments favored the northern industry while
selecting both trade policy and public spending and the northern population when levying the
taxes necessary to finance these investments and the mounting public debt.8 This platform
soon produced unplanned and remarkable consequences for the whole peninsula.
The 1861 introduction of the Piedmontese custom tariffs, among the lowest in Europe,
decreased of 80 percent the average southern custom duty irreparably exposing the exports
of olive oil and citrus to the end of the century fall in international prices (Pescosolido,
2011). To make things worse for the South, the 1887 trade policy reform strengthened only
the protection of the North-based wheat breeding and production of iron, which in turn was
booming thanks to the public subsidization of the Genoese steamboat producers and the
exclusion by law of the Neapolitan firms from navigation (Pescosolido, 2011). Similar public
procurement policies guided land reclamation with only 4 per cent of the relative spending
invested in the South before World War I (Iuzzolino et al., 2011), harbor development (Picci,
2002), and railway diffusion. The last one is the most telling case. Despite being the item
8In 1861, the public debt amounted to the 40 percent of the total GDP (Pescosolido, 2011).
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least preferred by the southern population, historically more at ease with maritime routes
than with the grueling Appenine passages, it constituted the 67 (53) percent of the 1861-
1881(1911) Italian public spending (Picci, 2002) and favored the northern regions. Liguria
and Piedmont indeed enjoyed over the period an average 874 (457)—1861—lire railway
spending per square km, which was 12 (3) times bigger than that received by Veneto and 18
(4) times higher than that gained by the other regions (see Ragioneria Generale dello Stato
[1909] and upper-right graph in figure 2). More important, the real purpose of this effort
“was more the military one of controlling the national territory, especially in the South, than
favoring commerce [. . . ]. Railway fares acted in many cases as customs duties, making it
more economic for the South to export goods abroad by sea rather than try to sell [. . . ] via
railway” [Iuzzolino et al. 2011, p. 22]. Crucially, such an impressive infrastructural program
was financed by highly unbalanced tax rises. After an initial phase in which a 10 percent
surcharge was added to the pre-unitary tax rates, the 1864 reform fixed a target revenue to
be raised—i.e., “contingente”—equal to the 1863 yield plus 20 millions—i.e., 125 millions—
allocating it to nine fiscal districts resembling the pre-unitary states. The ex-Papal State
took on the 10 percent of the contingente, the ex-Kingdom of Two Sicilies the 40 percent, and
the rest of the Kingdom of Italy (ex-Kingdom of Sardinia) only 29 (21) percent.9 To further
weigh this burden down, between 1867 and 1868, two other 10 percent surcharges were added
to the contingente creating the disparities between high and middle-low political relevance
regions described in the upper-left graph in figure 1. In complaining about the oppressing
nature of these policies, the Sicilian senator Antonino Paterno`-Castello denounced that “the
excessive amount of the land property tax [. . . ] impacts mainly the small landowners, who
find themselves greatly burdened and deprived of the means necessary to organize a rational
farming” [Parravicini 1958, p. 163]. Eventually, the 1873 victory of the left-wing party,
which finally gave voice to the South (see bottom-left graph in figure 1), together with the
1876 achievement of the balanced budget, opened the way to more egalitarian policies—
i.e., “perequazione”—and, in particular, the 1888 removal of all surcharges and the craved
cadastral reform, which equalized by 1922 the regional tax rates (Parravicini, 1958).
At that point however, the divergence of the two economies was irreversible (Nitti, 1993).
9From 1867 (1871) on, 3 (13) millions were levied on the new Venetian (Roman) district (Parravicini 1958).
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The clothing, mechanical, and steel industries were wiped out from the South, while embry-
onic heavy equipment and manufacturing industries were established in the North (see table
2 and Iuzzolino et al., [2011]). More important, the impoverishment of the southern economy
deteriorated the relationship between the government and the southern population, who ex-
perienced the Unification as a seizure. This unchained a series of clashes going under the
name of “brigandage.” Between 1861 and 1864, this civil war brought about 20,000 southern
victims, imposed a de facto militarization of the area,10 and opened the way to the massive
emigration from the countryside (Felice, 2014). Accordingly, the 1890s ratio of emigrants
to total population accelerated in the South surpassing by far that in North (Iuzzolino et
al., 2011). Moreover, the population started to display a progressively weaker culture as
prompted by the fall of the share of active population engaged in political, union, and reli-
gious activities (see figure 2), which constitutes an outcome-based measure of social capital
and was initially higher in the South. Contrary to the conclusions of the extant literature
indeed (Guiso et al., 2016), the present-day cultural advantage of the North does not predate
the Unification. To see this, the leftmost graph in figure 2 shows the homogeneity between
clusters in the cumulated discounted number of years of activity over the 1000-1600 period
of Cistercian and Franciscan houses. Boranbay and Guerriero (2016) document that these
monks met the population’s demand for insurance against consumption shocks in exchange
for the acceptance of a culture of cooperation and so, at the European level, there is a strong
correlation between their expansion and present-day norms of respect and trust.
Later on, the fascist regime’s aversion to internal migrations and its rush to arming,
managed through investments in the northern heavy industry, have stretched even more the
North-South gap (Iuzzolino et al., 2011), which has been only barely filled by the 1960s
economic booms and state aids. Despite these more recent events however, it is clear that
the present-day divide originated in the policies set by the first post-unitary governments.
3 Theory
Consider a territory divided in two regions r ∈ {N,S}, each inhabited by a mass zero
elite and a mass one of equal citizens consuming a region-specific public good gr and a
10In 1870, half of the Kingdom’s army—120,000 units—policed the South (Felice, 2014).
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private good, whose demand and supply are Dr and Xr. In the case of 19th century Italy,
N represents the Kingdom of Sardinia and S stands for any of the other states annexed by
the Kingdom of Italy in 1861. In each region r, the citizenry produces Xr = ArCr, where
Ar > 0 is the region-specific productivity parameter and Cr labels an input provided by
citizenry and, in particular, either his culture of cooperation or his human capital. The first
interpretation links directly our setup to the extant literature on the medieval determinants
of the present-day divide, and it is consistent with the huge evidence according to which
a culture of cooperation is pivotal to curb transaction costs, expand market exchange, and
facilitate the division of labor (Tabellini, 2010; Guerriero, 2016). In terms of our historical
experiment, Xr is the product of a market-oriented farming activity requiring a progressively
more sophisticated technology and higher division of labor, i.e., arboriculture and sericulture.
Timing.—The order of economic and policy choices is the following:
At time zero, the citizenry of region r linearly invests in Cr. When the input is cul-
ture, this assumption captures two fundamental insights of evolutionary psychology and
Malthusian growth theories: a social group dictates to its members, via natural selection
and cross-punishment, cultural norms maximizing its fitness (Barkow et al., 1992; Clark,
2007; Galor, 2011), and these norms are embraced by the group’s members the faster the
larger the culturally-driven reproductive advantage is (Andersen et al., 2016). Hence, it is
reasonable to maintain that in the Malthusian environment discussed in section 2 a citizenry
expecting larger returns from cooperation ends up with a larger culture Cr.
At time one and under autarky (political union), the elite of region r (N) selects the
rate(s) tr (t
U
N and t
U
S ) at which the private good is then taxed. Under autarky (political
union), each tax rate maximizes the regional (northern) elite’s rent net of linear tax-collection
costs plus the welfare of the region’s citizenry (weighted by a parameter lower than one and
increasing with the region’s political relevance for the northern elite in the case of tUS ).
At time two and under autarky (political union), the private good is produced, and the
elite of region r (N) uses a share α < 1 (α in the North and αU < α in the South) of the
regional tax revenues to obtain with a linear technology gr and pockets the rest. Next, the
citizenry of region r consumes both gr and the untaxed private good.
Discussion.—The northern elite’s ability to seize all unitary rents captures the supremacy
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of the Piedmontese elite over the first post-unitary governments. The inequality αU < α
implies furthermore that the northern elite could extract from the southern population a
rent larger than that possibly obtainable by the southern elite. This closely squares with
the constraints on the pre-unitary rulers’ extractive power imposed by the credible threat of
unrests on the one hand and with the post-unitary occupation of the southern regions by the
northern army on the other hand. Finally, the restriction on the weight the northern elite
attaches to the southern citizenry’s welfare captures one of the key stylized facts discussed
in section 2: the first post-unitary governments privileged the regions closest to the most
dangerous foreign enemies and thus most useful (dangerous) for defense purposes (in case
of a treachery). As aforementioned, not only the industries operating in these regions were
initially favored by the unitary state’s choice of both trade policy and public spending, but
the relative populations also gained the most from the 1870s reforms of the contingente.11
3.1 Autarky
Under autarky, the citizenry of region r selects Cr maximizing the objective function
√
Dr + γgr − Cr =
√(
1− tˆr
)
Xr + αγtˆrXr − Cr =
√
t˜rArCr − Cr, (1)
where hats label equilibrium quantities, t˜r ≡ 1−tˆr (1− αγ), and γ gauges the citizenry’s rela-
tive preferences for gr vis-a-vis Dr. We hypothesize that αγ > 1, and thus that the citizenry
prefers public to private good production. This restriction reflects the urgency of public
spending in railway diffusion (land reclamation and harbor development) felt by the north-
ern (southern) bourgeoisie up against the backwardness of the local economy (Pescosolido,
2011).12 The unique and global equilibrium levels of investment and consumption equal
Cˆr = t˜r
Ar
4
. Therefore, Dˆr =
(
1− tˆr
)
ArCˆr and the citizenry’s welfare is Vr = t˜r
Ar
4
. Taking
into account the citizenry’s choice of Cr, the elite of region r selects a tax policy maximizing
(1− α−K) trArCˆr + Vr, (2)
11Envisioning a fall in the quality of gS under political union would not change the gist of the model.
12Allowing the level of public good to shape future investment is an important avenue for further research.
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where the marginal tax-collection costs are such that K > max
{
1− α, γ−1
γ
}
. This last
assumption is consistent with the limits to war waging imposed on the pre-unitary states
(Kingdom of Italy) by the Congress of Vienna (Triple Alliance) and discussed in section 2
(5). The unique and global solution to problem (2) is tˆr =
1
2Ar(K+α−1)− 12(αγ−1) , which falls as
K increases due to the larger taxation costs and rises with γ because of the larger sub-utility
from public good consumption. In addition, tˆr decreases with Ar since at the margin the
social gains from taxation are fixed—i.e., 1 − αγ, whereas the relative social costs net of
rents are increasing with the regional productivity. Finally, tˆr has an uncertain relationship
with α, which decreases the elite’s rents but augments the sub-utility from public good
consumption. Thus, the equilibrium investment and welfare equal Ar
8
+ αγ−1
8(K+α−1) , which rises
with Ar, γ, and α and falls with K, which is an inverse measure of the feasibility of public
good production. Tax revenues tˆrArCˆr =
αγ−1
16(K+α−1)2 −
A2r
16(αγ−1) display behaviors similar to
tˆr and thus fall with Ar and K, rise with γ, and have an uncertain relationship with α.
3.2 Political Union
The northern elite devotes now to the production of the public good gS only a share
αU < 1 −K of tax revenues. Given our restrictions on K, αU < 1 −K < 1
γ
. In words, we
assume that under political union the extent of extraction from the South is sufficiently severe
to make at the margin taxation profitable for the northern elite and, given the assumed limits
to state capacity, to endogenously let the citizenry prefer private to public good production.
Since the tax revenues not appropriated by the northern elite from region r finance gr, the
citizenry’s problem is the same as in autarky and CˆUN = V
U
N = t˜
U
N
AN
4
= t˜N
AN
4
= VN = CˆN ,
CˆUS = V
U
S = t˜
U
S
AS
4
, and t˜US ≡ 1−tˆUS
(
1− αUγ). The northern elite selects {tUN , tUS}maximizing
(1− α−K) tNAN CˆUN +
(
1− αU −K) tSASCˆUS + V UN + βV US , (3)
where β < 1 is the weight attached to the southern citizenry’s welfare and reflects his political
relevance. Since there is no trade between regions, tˆUN = tˆN , tˆ
U
S =
1
2(1−αUγ) − β2AS(1−αU−K) ,
and tˆUSASCˆ
U
S =
A2S
16(1−αUγ) −
β2(1−αUγ)
16(1−αU−K)2 . Thus, the tax revenues raised in the South increase
with both AS and γ, decrease with K, and have again an uncertain relationship with α
U .
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The first comparative statics is different from the equivalent one under autarky because now
marginal rent-extraction benefits are higher than the marginal tax-collection costs, and thus
an increase in regional productivity and so private good production calls for more extraction.
Finally, tˆUSASCˆ
U
S fall with β and are larger than under autarky when AS is not too small
and β → 0. As seen in section 2, over the 19th century the South kept a significant but
not extreme technological primacy and displayed the most limited political relevance for the
Piedmontese elite. Accordingly, the first post-unitary governments extracted from (imposed
on) the southern regions above-average (the largest distortions in) tax revenues per capita,
which were also larger than those raised by the Bourbons, as shown by the upper-left graph
in figure 1 (3). The following proposition summarizes the key aspects of the above analysis:
Proposition 1: Under autarky, the tax revenues raised in the South fall with the regional
productivity AS and decrease with the marginal tax-collection costs K. Under political union,
they rise with AS, fall with both K and the political relevance of the South for the northern
elite β, and are larger than under autarky if AS is not too small and β → 0.13
Next, we take stock of the results obtained so far to analyze the impact on investment
and economic outcomes of an exogenous shock turning autarky into a political union.
3.3 The Rise of the North-South Divide
Under political union, the southern citizenry’s investment and welfare CˆUS = V
U
S =
AS
8
+
β(1−αUγ)
8(1−αU−K) rise withK, β, and α
U since all these factors curb extraction and so investment
distortions. Moreover, a little of algebra shows that, since 1−K < 1
γ
, the southern citizenry’s
welfare is higher under autarky (political union) for β lower (higher) than
(αγ−1)(1−αU−K)
(1−αUγ)(K+α−1) .
Going back to our historical experiment, given levels of αU , γ, and K common to all the
annexed regions, those to which the Piedmontese elite assigned a sufficiently large β should
have gained from Unification, whereas those for which β was moderate or low should have
lost. Consistent with this remark, the upper(bottom)-right graph in figure 1 displays a
positive link between (distortions in) railway diffusion and the regional political relevance.
The following proposition summarizes the key elements of the above investigation:
Proposition 2: Under political union, both the southern citizenry’s investment CˆUS and
13To elaborate, tˆUSASCˆ
U
S > tˆSASCˆS whenever
A2S
16(1−αUγ) +
A2S
16(αγ−1) >
β2(1−αUγ)
16(1−αU−K)2 +
αγ−1
16(K+α−1)2 .
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welfare V US rise with the marginal tax-collection costs K and the political relevance β, and
they are lower (higher) than under autarky for β sufficiently small (large).
Our model provides a theory of endogenous extractive policies in a political or economic
union dominated by one of its constituents caring asymmetrically about the remaining mem-
bers. One key extension to our analysis is to endogenize the parameter β to consider reforms
towards a more democratic political process constraining the northern elite’s choices (North
et al., 2009; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Boranbay and Guerriero, 2016). Similarly, the
elite might be induced to extract less if worried that the South’s citizenry could opt out of the
modern sector producing XS and specialize instead in a sector demanding no investments.
We leave the first robustness check to future research being less related to our historical
experiment, but we discuss in details the second one in the following section.
3.4 General Equilibrium Disincentives to Extraction
The southern citizenry can consume an alternative good TS—i.e., wheat—produced
through a “traditional” technology, which is linear in the productivity parameter LS with
LS <
A2S
16
+
βAS(1−αUγ)
8(1−αU−K) −
3β2(1−αUγ)2
16(1−αU−K)2 . Being the traditional sector technology independent
of investment activities, the indirect utility of the citizenry S producing the good TS equals√
(1− τˆUS )TS + αUγτˆUS TS =
√
τ˜US LS, where τ
U
S is the tax rate levied on the traditional
good in the South and τ˜US ≡ 1 − τˆUS
(
1− αUγ). In equilibrium, V US = β(1−αUγ)2(1−αU−K) because
τUS =
1
1−αUγ −
β2(1−αUγ)
4LS(1−αU−K)2 . Thus, the southern citizenry selects the traditional sector if
αU < 3β−AS(1−K)
3βγ−AS ≡ αU , even if the northern elite would always prefer otherwise under our
restriction on LS. Therefore, the latter is now willing to extract a weakly lower surplus by
acting as if αU was at least αU to levy taxes on a more productive activity. The northern
elite will face a similar incentive, should we allow for inter-group trade. In this last case, ex-
traction is curbed by the prospect of cheap imports. Since regional trades were very limited
over our sample (Iuzzolino et al., 2011), we leave also this extension to future research.
4 Empirical Implications
Our model produces two sets of implications regarding the aforementioned thirteen
present-day Italian regions incorporated by the Kingdom of Italy before World War I but not
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part of the Kingdom of Sardinia. While the first one concerns the determinants of pre-unitary
and post-unitary tax policies, the second one deals with the impact of the post-unitary de-
terminants of tax policies on both post-unitary economic outcomes and investment. These
implications can be restated as testable predictions in the following manner:
Predictions: Pre-unitary tax revenues will fall with both the region’s productivity and
the marginal tax-collection costs but will be independent of the region’s political relevance for
the Piedmontese elite. Post-unitary tax revenues will increase with the region’s productivity
and decrease with both the marginal tax-collection costs and the region’s political relevance.
Finally, post-unitary economic outcomes and both cultural and human capital accumulation
will rise with the marginal tax-collection costs and the region’s political relevance.
5 Evidence
To test our predictions, we need, first and foremost, information on the most economically
relevant taxes, proxies for the regional productivity, the tax-collection costs, and the regional
political relevance, and measures of economic outcomes and both cultural and human capital
accumulation. Furthermore, we require an appropriate empirical strategy.
5.1 Measuring Taxation and Its Determinants
Following the extant literature on the North-South divide (Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea,
2013), we base our analysis on 10-year benchmarks. Moreover, we focus on the period
around the Unification over which the thirteen regions we consider kept stable territorial
limits and extractive policies remained region-specific, i.e., 1801-1911 (Parravicini, 1958;
Galasso, 2011).14 Elaborating on the first sample feature, we employ present-day regional
boundaries, but our results are similar if we switch to the historical ones.15 For what con-
cerns extractive policies, we look at the land property taxation being the Italian economy
essentially agrarian over the 19th century. In absence of sufficient information on pre-unitary
fiscal legislation and given the peculiar features of the contingente method however, we focus
on the revenues from land property taxes—i.e., “imposta sul valore fondiario”—per capita
14This is roughly the period elapsing between the treaty of Campo Formio (1797) and World War I.
15Piedmont, Liguria, and Sardinia were part of the Kingdom of Sardinia, whereas after the annexation of the
Venetian and Roman provinces, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Trentino-Alto Adige were entirely incorporated
by the Kingdom of Italy in respectively 1918 and 1919. Finally, Molise was separated from Abruzzi in 1963.
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in 1861 lire—i.e., Land-Taxes—employing the closest year in the case of an unavailable ob-
servation (see table 1). Land property taxes accounted for 54 percent of direct taxes over the
sample, have been region-specific up to 1922, and hit the profitability from land property
shaping in turn the landowner’s investment decisions (see section 2). To show that our results
are not driven by differences in land availability, we document in the Internet appendix that
they are similar if we divide revenues by the arable land. Unfortunately, we cannot compare
our estimates with those one would obtain using the milling tax since this was introduced
in 1868 and abolished in 1884, and thus an insufficient number of observations is available.
To gauge the productivity of the key farming activities, we exploit the geographic inputs
to the technologies producing silk, citrus, olives, and wheat. While the first three correspond
to the marked-oriented sector analyzed in the basic model, wheat breeding embodies the
traditional sector discussed in section 3.4. Building on section 2, we proxy the productivity
of sericulture with the normalized first principal component extracted from the share of the
region’s surface covered by large lakes and rivers and the average growing season precipitation
in the previous decade in ml, i.e., Sericulture.16 Turning to wheat farming and arboriculture,
we build on a legacy of agronomy studies showing that they weakly rise with the relevant
land suitability and both the growing season precipitation and temperature (Britannica,
2014), and we use principal component analysis to aggregate only those geographic features
positively correlated to the underlying “productivity” construct (Rosenthal and Voeten,
2007). Accordingly, we elect as a proxy for the productivity of wheat farming the variable
Wheat, which is the normalized first principal component extracted from the land suitability
for wheat in hundredth and the average growing season precipitation in the previous decade
in ml, and as a proxy for the productivity of arboriculture the variable Arboriculture, which
is the normalized first principal component extracted from the land suitabilities for citrus
and olive trees in hundredth and the average growing season temperature in the previous
decade in Celsius degrees.17 Consistent with our choice, the growing season temperature
16The basin (precipitation) data are in grid format, cover the entire World (Europe) at a 0.5 degrees spatial
resolution (and for the 1400-1900 period), and are collected from the GLWD dataset (Pauling et al., 2006).
To the best of our knowledge, there is no information on the land suitability for mulberry and grapevine in
our sample. Characterizing the viticulture technology is an important avenue for future research since the
export of wine was an relevant source of income in 19th century Italy (Pescosolido, 2011).
17The land (temperature) data are in grid format, cover the entire World (Europe) at a 0.5 degrees spatial
resolution (and for the 1500-2004 period), and come from the GAEZ dataset (Luterbacher et al., 2004).
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(precipitation) does not correlate with the first principal component extracted from itself, the
land suitability(ies) for wheat (citrus and olive trees), and the growing season precipitation
(temperature). To validate our measurement exercise, first we document the significant—
conditional on time effects—partial correlation of our proxies with the contemporaneous
production of respectively silk in kg per kg of silkworm incubated, wheat in hectoliters per
cultivated hectare, and both citrus fruits per tree and olive oil in hectoliters per cultivated
hectare (MAIC, 1864, 1881, 1892, 1900, and 1912), and then we show that our estimates are
similar when we focus instead on the productivity of either citrus or olive breeding (see the
Internet appendix). We cannot use directly the land suitabilities for wheat, citrus, and olive
trees, the share of surface covered by lakes and rivers, and the growing season temperature
and precipitation since the first four will be absorbed by the fixed effects, while the last two
will not capture alone the productivity of either arboriculture or sericulture.
Turning to the marginal tax-collection costs, we follow Dincecco et al. (2011) and we
incorporate into the analysis the share of previous decade in which the state to which the
region belonged partook in external wars, i.e., War. A broad literature has shown that a
key determinant of a state capacity to raise tax revenues is the provision of common interest
public goods, such as fighting external wars (Besley and Persson, 2009). Accordingly, higher
values of War should correspond to lower marginal tax-collection costs. Our results will be
similar, should we consider the share of years from the Congress of Vienna in which the state
to which the region belonged partook in external wars (see the Internet appendix).
Finally, we employ as an inverse metrics of a region’s military saliency and in turn
political relevance for the Piedmontese elite the distance in km between the region’s main
city and the capital of the foreign power most adverse to the House of Savoy, i.e., Vienna
over the 1801-1813, 1848-1881, and 1901-1914 periods, and Paris otherwise, i.e., Distance-
to-Enemies. Our choice can be explained as follows. Conquered by Napoleon in 1796, the
Kingdom of Sardinia came out from the Congress of Vienna as an independent reign including
also Genoa and formally opposed to France (Galasso, 2011). Yet, the Austro-Sardinian War
ignited by the Spring of Nations fired up an enmity between the Savoys and Austria that
flowed in 1859 and 1866 into respectively the Second and Third Wars of Independence.
France took this opportunity to draw up an alliance with the Kingdom of Sardinia with the
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twofold aim of gaining back Nice and the Savoy and erecting a wall against Austria. The
French-Italian coalition ended in 1881 when France established a protectorate in Tunisia.
Frustrated in its colonial efforts, Italy secured in 1882 the Triple Alliance with Austria and
Germany by committing to mutual support against a French attack. The deterioration of the
relationship between England and the Triple Alliance due to Otto von Bismark’s “realpolitik”
and the conflicts in Africa promoted however the 1902 French-Italian colonial agreements.
The revived Paris-Rome axis paved the way to the end of the Triple Alliance and the blast
of World War I. In a placebo test, we document that the average distance in km of each
region’s main city from the capital/s of the foreign power/s less salient for the House of
Savoy,18 because excluded from the Congress of Vienna and/or from the Triple Alliance and
Entente, is never significant in our regressions (see the Internet appendix).
5.2 Endogenous Taxation
We estimate endogenous taxation equations of the type
LTr,t = αr + β
′
0Ar,t + β
′
1A
2
r,t + γ0Sr,t + γ1S
2
r,t + δ0Pr,t + δ1P
2
r,t + r,t, (4)
where LTr,t is Land-Taxes in region r and year t, the vector Ar,t gathers Sericulture, Wheat,
and Arboriculture, Sr,t labels War, and Pr,t is Distance-to-Enemies. αr accounts for time-
invariant differences across regions like the land suitability for agriculture, the surface, the
arable land, and long-lasting institutional structures. Including the squared terms of Ar,t,
Sr,t, and Pr,t into equation (4) allows us to consider the nonlinearities in the functional forms
of the equilibrium tax revenues (see section 3). The key implications to be tested are that
the marginal effect of a rise in either Sericulture or Arboriculture is negative (positive) and
significant in the pre(post)-unitary sample, the marginal effect of an increase in War is pos-
itive and significant, and the marginal effect of a rise in Distance-to-Enemies is insignificant
in the pre-unitary sample and positive and significant otherwise (see section 4).19
In judging our empirical strategy, it is important to highlight the adequacy of the speci-
18This (these) is (are) Istanbul between 1801 and 1815 (Amsterdam, Copenhagen, and Istanbul between 1816
and 1882 and Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Istanbul, Lisbon, and Madrid between 1883 and 1914).
19For instance, the second marginal effect can be expressed in terms of the parameters of equation (4) as(
γˆ0 + 2γˆ1S
)
∆, where ∆ is the rise in War from the value S, whereas γˆ0 and γˆ1 are estimated coefficients.
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fication and the exogeneity of the regressors. Starting from the former, an important caveat
to our approach might be that Unification dramatically changed the structure of the regional
economies making our positive taxation model inadequate for the post-unitary sample. Yet,
over the 1861-1911 period, the percentage of the active population employed in the indus-
trial sectors grew in the North by only one percent—i.e., from 12 to 13—and felt in the
South by only two percent, i.e., from 14 to 12. Therefore, Italy remained before World
War I an intrinsically agricultural economy (Pescosolido, 2011): this evidence fully supports
our assumption of no structural break between the two samples. For what concerns the
exogeneity of the regressors, three observations are key. First, the controls encapsulated in
Ar,t are exogenous because driven by either climate shocks or features of the region’s terrain
independent of human effort. Second, War is determined by the following six conflicts: 1.
“Austro-Sardinian” War of 1848; 2. “Roman Republic” War of 1849; 3. “Italian Unifica-
tion” War of 1859; 4. “Italian-Roman” War of 1860; 5. “Neapolitan” War of 1860; 6. “Seven
Weeks” War of 1866. As detailed in the Internet appendix, these clashes were unfold by the
pre-unitary foreign policy of the Kingdom of Sardinia, the unrests provoked by the Spring
of Nations, and the German realpolitik. Hence, since the Piedmontese elite did not foresee
the Unification at the inception of the struggles, none of the policy makers fixing LTr,t in
equation (4) affected the evolution of these conflicts (Killinger, 2002; Paoletti, 2008; Riall,
2009). Finally, also Distance-to-Enemies is determined by events outside the control of the
elites of the pre-unitary states and of the Piedmontese elite after the Unification, like the
Congress of Vienna, the Spring of Nations, the French expansion in Tunisia, and the German
realpolitik.20 Furthermore, since the relative marginal effect is identified by its time varia-
tion, Distance-to-Enemies cannot simply reflect the distance from international markets or
unobserved time-invariant regional differences. Finally, multicollinearity is not an issue in
our empirical exercise since the correlation between War and Distance-to-Enemies is limited.
Columns (1) to (3) of table 3 display the estimates for three alternative specifications for
the pre-unitary sample, the first excluding both War and Distance-to-Enemies, the second
excluding only Distance-to-Enemies, and the third one including all controls. Columns (4)
20For the 1801-1851 sample, we cannot construct a proxy for the political relevance of each region for the
elite of the pre-unitary state to which it belonged since the partition of Italy by the Congress of Vienna was
precisely aimed to assure that none of these states could attack or be attacked by the neighboring states.
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to (6) of table 3 have the same structure but are based on the post-unitary sample. To
control for arbitrary correlation within groups, all the regressions we run allow for clustering
by region. We will obtain similar results, should we deal with generic spatial dependence in
the error term by relying on the Conley (1999) standard errors (see the Internet appendix).
For the most part, the results are consistent with the model predictions, and the implied
effects are large. First, in the pre-unitary sample a rise in Arboriculture from the lowest
North’s value—i.e., 0.2 in Lombardy—to the highest South’s one—i.e., 0.99 in Apulia—
implies a 8.1-standard-deviation fall in Land-Taxes in column (1) and is always significant
at 10 percent or better in columns (1) to (3). This is not the case for either Sericulture or
Wheat. These patterns are consistent with the aforementioned mid-19th century boom in
arboriculture exports and the Pebrine epidemic. Second, the proxies for farming produc-
tivities are insignificant in the post-unitary sample as expected given the fierce competition
experienced by Italy at the end of the 19th century. Third, lower marginal tax-collection
costs are not significantly related to larger land property tax revenues. This last piece of
evidence is possibly driven by both the constraints on the pre-unitary states’ ability to wage
war imposed by the Congress of Vienna and the fewness of the external conflicts involv-
ing the Kingdom of Italy between Unification and World War I (see section 2). Finally,
Distance-to-Enemies is irrelevant to explain pre-unitary regional taxation but represents the
strongest predictor of post-unitary land property taxes. Indeed, an increase in the distance
of the region’s main city from the worst House of Savoy’s enemies from the lowest North’s
value—i.e., 504 in Veneto—to the highest South’s one—i.e., 1206 in Sicily—is linked to a
0.7-standard-deviation rise in Land-Taxes, which is significant at 5 percent (see column (6)).
All in all, it is fair to summarize our results stating that pre-unitary tax policies trade-off
net tax-collection costs minimization and the citizenry’s welfare maximization, whereas post-
unitary ones respond only to the asymmetric rent-seeking interests of the Piedmontese elite.
Next, we study the impact of this rational extraction process on post-unitary outcomes.
5.3 The Rise of the North-South Divide
Given the functional form for V US = Cˆ
U
S , we estimate outcome equations of the type
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Yr,t = αr + β
′
2Ar,t + γ2Sr,t + γ3S
2
r,t + δ2Pr,t + ζDr,t + νr,t, (5)
where Yr,t is the ratio of one among six variables to its 1861 value, i.e., GDP, Culture, Illit-
erates, VA-F, VA-C, and VA-M (see table 1). These variables are respectively the income
in 1861 lire per capita, the share of active population engaged in political, union, and reli-
gious activities, the share of the population aged over six that was illiterate, and the value
added in the foodstuff, clothing, and manufacturing sector in millions of 1861 lire. While
Culture is a proxy for cultural accumulation, Illiterates is negatively linked to human capital
accumulation.21 Moreover, the foodstuff and clothing value added gauge the profitability of
the industries processing arboricolture and sericulture products, whereas the manufacturing
value added coarsely measures the Italian industrialization in the residual sectors. When
needed, we impute a missing observation with the following decade data point. This choice
does not affect the gist of our results, which indeed remain similar when we switch to the
1871-1911 sub-sample (see the Internet appendix).22 For this period, we observe almost all
the variables. Our results are also robust to dividing each value added by the population or to
proxying Yr,t with either the gross saleable annual farming product, the life expectancy, the
average height of conscripted workers, or the population density (see the Internet appendix).
αr controls again for time-invariant differences across regions like unobserved local inputs
and long-lasting institutional arrangements as the inclusiveness of the pre-unitary political
process.23 To avoid that the latter is biasing our results through a time-variant effect, we
experiment in the Internet appendix with time dummies and their interaction with the av-
erage over the 1000-1600 period of the inclusiveness of regional political institutions coded
by Boranbay and Guerriero (2016). To preserve a sufficient within-region variation in these
regressions, we do not cluster standard errors at the regional level. Our results imply that
our conclusions are not driven by region-invariant unobservables and medieval political in-
stitutions as instead prompted by the extant literature (Tabellini, 2010; Guiso et al., 2016).
Dr,t is the difference between the observed Land-Taxes and the land property tax revenues
21Felice and Vasta (2015) propose a different but less reliable proxy for culture (Daniele and Malanima, 2014).
22In this robustness check, we measure Yr,t with the ratio of each variable to its 1871 value.
23Lynn (2010) claims that genetic differences are the crucial driver of the North-South imbalances. Yet, this
odd argument has been proven completely unfounded by Felice and Giugliano (2011).
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per capita forecasted using the specification in column (1) of table 3, i.e., Distortion-LT. We
do not use as forecasting model one of the specifications reported in columns (2) and (3) of
the same table since post-unitary values of Sr,t and Pr,t should be irrelevant in the counter-
factual autarky regime. In our model, the severity of post-unitary extraction entails that
the southern citizenry prefers private to public good production, and thus observed tax
revenues higher than the counterfactual autarky equilibrium—i.e., positive Distortion-LT
values—imply excessive taxation. This interpretation is consistent with the evidence on the
inefficiency of post-unitary public spending in the South discussed in section 2. By an argu-
ment similar to that proposed above, Distortion-LT should be considered exogenous because
caused by events outside the control of the Piedmontese elite. We expect that the marginal
effect of a rise in War, δ2, and ζ are negative (positive if the dependent variable is Illiter-
ates) and significant. Since however Distortion-LT incorporates unobserved components of
the tax-collection costs and the region’s political relevance, we anticipate that, should the
marginal effect of a rise in Sr,t and/or δ2 be significant, the coefficient ζ will be insignificant.
A glance at figures 1 and 3 confirms the model predictions. The two upper-graphs
in figure 1 show the opposite post-unitary evolutions of land property tax revenues and
railway diffusion. In a nutshell, the regions less politically relevant for the Piedmontese elite
experienced both the most hindering tax policies and the weakest public effort in railway
construction, whereas the opposite is true for the regions nearest to the French and Austrian
borders (see figure 1). A similar pattern arises when post-unitary distortions in land property
taxes are compared with the changes in the value added in the foodstuff sector, culture, and
illiterates (see figure 3). Over the 1861-1911 period, Distortion-LT is the lowest in Veneto,
which gained from the Unification a 1.188—1861—lire per capita average fall in land property
taxes, and the highest in the South, which paid the Unification with a 0.580—1861—lire per
capita average rise in Land-Taxes. To put these figures into perspective, a back-of-the-
envelope calculation based on the average farming profitability in Sicily reveals that tax
distortions raised of seven times the 1871 start-up cost of a citrus cultivation in the South,
i.e., from less than one to six months of average after-tax farming profits per square km
of arable land.24 Not surprisingly, braked by this huge rise in investment costs and absent
24To get the after-tax profits, we combined the facts that the average (distortions in) land property tax revenues
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developed financial markets, the South witnessed the slowest growth in the value added in
the foodstuff sector, the sharpest fall in culture, and the most limited decline in illiteracy.
Multivariate analysis confirms these relationships. In particular, panels A to D of table 4
list the estimates of equation (5) for four specifications always including the proxies for the
regional productivity. A first one incorporates also War and War 2, a second one adds only
Distance-to-Enemies, a third one throws in only Distortion-LT, and a last one considers all
controls. Again, the estimates are consistent with the testable predictions, and the marginal
effects are sizable. To illustrate, a one-standard-deviation rise in War—i.e., 0.01—from its
post-unitary mean—i.e., 0.005—corresponds to a 0.8-standard-deviation fall in GDP, a 0.6-
standard-deviation decrease in Culture, and a 1-standard-deviation increase in Illiterates (see
panel D). Similarly, a rise in Distance-to-Enemies from the lowest North’s to the highest
South’s value implies a 0.8-standard-deviation fall in GDP and a 0.5-standard-deviation
decrease in Culture, whereas a one-standard-deviation increase in Distortion-LT or 1.8—
1861—lire per capita leads to a 1.4(0.9)-standard-deviation decrease in VA-F and VA-M
(VA-C ). All these coefficients are significant at 10 percent or better. All in all, as expected,
either the state capacity together with the inverse measure of the regional political relevance
or tax distortions are strong predictors of the rise of the North-South gap.
5.4 Identifying Causal Relationships
The empirical results discussed so far are all consistent with the testable predictions
produced by our model (see section 4). To evaluate whether they are driven by unobserved
heterogeneity, we pursue a two-step strategy. First we control for relevant observable factors,
and then we use selection on observables to assess the bias from unobservables.
5.4.1 Controlling for Observables
We consider four observables possibly confounding the effect of tax distortions on out-
comes. First, to understand the impact of the technological drivers of the Industrial Revolu-
tion, we look at the horsepower units of hydroelectric and water power production in millions
per square km of arable land in the South were 565 (483) lire and that, building on Dimico et al. (2012),
Pescosolido (2010), and SVIMEZ (2011), the average pretax farming profit per square km of arable land in
Sicily was 5964 lire. Being seed and labor costs negligible, the main start-up expenses were the five years of
land property taxes to be payed while the newly planted trees became productive (Britannica, 2014).
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of 1861 lire, i.e., HW-Power (Missiaia, 2012). Water represented the single and most im-
portant energy endowment in the post-unitary period and became increasingly relevant for
the newborn industry (Missiaia, 2012). Second, we tackle the possibility that demographic
differences, captured by the population per square kilometer—i.e., Population-D, determine
outcomes by shaping the incidence of land property taxes. In the Internet appendix, we also
experiment by using the ratio of this variable to its 1861 value as an alternative proxy for
economic outcomes with the idea that it could capture better than GDP the development of
the essentially agrarian Italian regions. This exercise delivers a qualitative similar evidence.
Third, to evaluate the idea that the unequal land ownership and income created an extrac-
tive bourgeoisie in the South (Felice, 2014), we include into the analysis the Gini coefficient,
i.e., Gini (Vecchi, 2011). We also obtain a qualitatively similar evidence when Illiterates is
used as a control rather than as a dependent variable. Finally, we incorporate the ratio of
the non tradable goods regional wage to the Italian average, i.e., Wages (Felice and Vasta,
2015). Controlling for Wages should exclude that either the selection of the conversion rates
between pre-unitary currencies and the lire or wage rigidities drive our results.
The estimates listed in panels A to D of table 5 reveal that our results remain almost
intact once we consider alternative explanations of the North-South divide. Consistent with
the historical analysis of section 2, while exchange rate policies and the fragmentation of
economic power do not make an economically relevant dent in explaining the post-unitary
divergence in the wellbeing of the two clusters, both the energy endowment and the popula-
tion density help shed further light on the post-unitary evolution of the Italian economy.
5.4.2 Using Selection on Observables to Assess the Bias from Unobservables
Despite our attempts to control for relevant observables, our estimates may still be biased
by unobservable factors correlated with either the regional productivity, the state capacity,
or the region’s political relevance for the Piedmontese elite. To evaluate this issue, we
calculate the index proposed by Altonji et al. (2005) to measure how much stronger selection
on unobservables, relative to selection on observables, must be to explain away the entire
estimated effect.25 To see how the index is calculated, consider a regression with a restricted
set of control variables and one with a full set of controls. Next, denote the estimate of the
25We use the version developed by Bellows and Miguel (2009) for possibly endogenous continuous variables.
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coefficient attached to the variable of interest from the first regression λR, where R stands
for “restricted,” and that from the second regression λF , where F stands for “full.” Then,
the index is the absolute value of λF/(λR − λF ). The intuition behind the formula is as
follows. The lower the absolute value of (λR − λF ) is, the less the estimate of the coefficient
attached to the variable of interest is affected by selection on observables, and the stronger
selection on unobservables needs to be to explain away the entire effect. Moreover, the
higher the absolute value of λF is, the greater is the effect that needs to be explained away
by selection on unobservables, and thus the higher the index is. We focus on the variables
testing the key model predictions (see table 6), and in particular respectively the proxy for
the productivity of arboriculture and the measure of the regional political relevance in the
endogenous taxation models run respectively on the pre-unitary and post-unitary samples
(see column (1) and (2)), and War, War 2, Distance-to-Enemies, and Distortion-LT in the
outcome equations (see columns (3) to (8)). The group of covariates incorporated only in the
full set is reported in the last three rows of table 6 and includes in the case of the outcome
regressions HW-Power, which is the single and most relevant extra control considered. We
will obtain similar indexes, should we focus instead on either Population-D, Gini, or Wages.
The median and the average indexes in columns (1) and (2) are 3.11 and 4.56, whereas the
median and the average indexes in columns (3) to (8) are 13.13 and 17.63. Thus, to attribute
the entire OLS estimates to selection effects, selection on unobservables would have to be
on average about 16 times greater than selection on observables. Given the high fit of our
regressions—i.e., with an average within R2 of 0.31 (59.2) in table 3 (panel D of table 4), it
is unlikely that our estimates are simply driven by unobserved heterogeneity.
5.5 Post-Unitary Distortions in Public Good Provision
One objection to our conclusions is that the post-unitary “North-South divergence was
not deliberately constructed by virtue of political decisions to the disadvantage of the South,
but it was even acceptable in a country whose productive system was highly differentiated”
(Iuzzolino et al., 2011). In other words, tax distortions would have been the price to be
paid to assure industrialization in the only part of the country structurally ready for it. To
evaluate this idea, we build on our model to first identify the pre-unitary determinants of
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railway diffusion and then assess its post-unitary distortions with a strategy similar to that
embraced in section 5.2. We estimate public good provision equations of the type
Rr,t = αr + ιt + β
′
3Ar,t + β
′
4A
2
r,t + γ4Sr,t + γ5S
2
r,t + δ3Pr,t + δ4P
2
r,t + τ0Orιt + ηr,t, (6)
where Rr,t is the length in km of railway per square km built in the previous decade, i.e.,
Railway. Following Picci (2002), we also consider the orographic nature of each region as a
proxy for railway building costs by including in the specification the terrain ruggedness Or
in Km—i.e., Ruggedness—interacted with time dummies ιt. Since ιt appears also as extra
control, we do not cluster standard errors at the regional level to preserve a sufficient within-
region variation. This time, αr accounts for time-invariant shifters of railway diffusion like
the traveling distance from international markets and long-lasting institutions.
Table 7 is structured in the same way as table 3. Two are the key observations. First, as
prompted by extant literature (Iuzzolino et al., 2011), the crucial aim of pre-unitary railway
diffusion was the strengthening of the intra-state trade of wheat. Accordingly, a rise in
Wheat from the lowest South’s value—i.e., 0.01 in Calabria—to the highest North’s one—
i.e., 0.79 in Lombardy—implies a 15.4-standard-deviation increase in Railway in column
(1) and is always significant at 5 percent in columns (1) to (3). Second, the post-unitary
railway expansion was only shaped by the regional political relevance. In particular, a rise
in Distance-to-Enemies from the lowest North’s value to the highest South’s value leads to
a 7.9-standard-deviation fall in Railway, which is significant at 5 percent (see column (6)).
Placing side to side these with the estimates discussed above, we can conclude that regions
farther away from the possible battlefields enjoyed the slowest post-unitary railway diffusion
but paid the highest relative costs. Moreover, plotting the differences between the observed
post-unitary values of Railway and those forecasted using the specification in column (1)
of table 7—i.e., Distortion-R—across regional clusters reveals that the South experienced
periods of both under- and over-investment in railway, whereas the effort in the North’s
network expansion was generally more intense than it would have been without Unification
(see bottom-right graph in figure 1). This evidence speaks against the idea that subsidization
of the northern infrastructures at the expenses of the South was optimal.
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5.6 External Validity: the American Civil War Case
To alleviate concerns that the Italian Unification might be a very special case, we discuss
in the following the closely related instance of the American Civil War.
Slavery was the key source of escalating political tension in the 1850s (Keller, 1977). The
Republican Party, dominated by the northern elite, was determined to prevent its spread, and
thus many southern leaders had threatened secession if the Republican candidate, Lincoln,
won the 1860 election. Once this happened, eleven southern states—i.e., Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
and Virginia—seceded and formed the Confederate States of America. This move unchained
a dreadful conflict against the twenty-three states remained loyal to the Union and the seven
territories that fought on their side, i.e., Colorado, Dakota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
Utah, and Washington. In four years the war brought almost one million casualties (Foner,
1988), the shooting of Lincoln, and the tacit understanding among the winners that the
“prewar leadership of the southern slavocrats in national politics was permanently to be
replaced in favor of the northern direction” [Donald and Randall 1961, p. 535].
South’s reintegration however soon became a tumultuous affair known as “Reconstruction
Era” (1863-77) and usually divided by historians in “Wartime,” “Presidential,” and “Radi-
cal” phases (Foner, 1988). While the first one identifies Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation
and the Union’s seizure of the Confederate states, the second one refers to the new president
Johnson’s try to guarantee “the white South a virtual hand in regulating the region’s internal
affairs” [Foner 1988, p. 199]. Yet, this attempt to undermine the consequences of the war
itself drove many northern radical Republicans to advocate a profound redistribution of the
South’s economic resources and political power away form the old elite of white planters in
favor of the blacks and poor whites (Keller, 1977). This Radical phase of the Reconstruction
program opened as soon as the Republicans gained in 1866 the majority of the US Congress,
was reinforced by Grant’s election in 1868, and “affected every facet of southern life” [Foner
1988, p. 346]. As in the case of the Italian Unification, the northern elite imposed a series
of heavily extractive policies (Keller, 1977). First, the ex-Confederate states were split into
five military districts under martial law to enforce black vote. In this way, the North could
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restrain the southern elite’s initiative sprang by Johnson’s policies to the point that the Rad-
ical politics assumed “a “colonial” pattern” [Foner 1988, p. 377]. Second, “property taxes
rose steadily” [Foner 1988, p. 383]. These tax rises are illustrated in the upper-left graph in
figure 4, which depicts the ratio of total taxes to GDP for the ex-Confederate states and the
pro-Union territories between 1850 and 1890. Crucially, the former surpassed the latter in
the 1870s. Republicans defended these policies as instrumental to obtain the necessary land
redistribution. In particular, if planters were unable to pay higher taxes, the government
would confiscate their properties and sell it to blacks and poor whites (Foner, 1988). Yet,
these groups had no means to buy, and thus the northern landowners quickly acquired a
sizable share of the southern properties and, for instance, “by 1870, half of the [Louisiana]
estates had fallen into the hands of northern investors” [Foner 1988, p. 399]. As a result,
not only the southern population could not escape its destitution, but it also failed to keep
“up with the phenomenal progress of the rest of the country” [Donald and Randall 1961,
p. 548]. The remainder in figure 4 displays these patterns by showing the evolution over
the 1850-1890 period of the GDP and the assessed valuations of taxed property and both
taxed real estate and improvements across ex-Confederate states and pro-Union territories.
As foreseen by our model, the states less politically relevant for the rulers endured the most
penalizing tax policies and, as result, experienced the weakest economic growth.
The Radical Reconstruction era came to an end when the Democratic leaders realized
that “financial criticisms of Republican rule” [Foner 1988, p. 415] would have moved both the
southern masses and those northern voters dissatisfied with the political instability created
by extraction.26 In the aftermath of its 1874 victory, the Democratic Party pushed for the
full integration of southern states into American politics and removed the last Union troops
from the South. Nevertheless, exactly as in the case of post-unitary Italy, the consequences
of extraction have been significant and long-lasting (Keller, 1977; Foner, 1988).
6 Conclusions
This paper has developed a theory of “endogenous extractive policies” grounded on the
26“If southern economic interests had coincided with those of the rising industrial groups of the North, there
would have been no Radical reconstruction” [Donald and Randall 1961, p. 543].
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mix of the heterogeneity in the relevance of the dominated groups for the dominating one
and changes in the rulers’ extractive power. Crucially, our model helps shed new light on a
key issue in economics, which is the huge divide between North and South of Italy despite
more than 150 years of common formal institutions. In fact, we document that its opening
is the result of the region-specific policies selected between 1861 and 1911 by the Kingdom
of Sardinia’s elite, which annexed the rest of Italy in 1861. Pre-unitary regional revenues
from land property taxes per capita indeed are mainly explained by each region’s farming
productivity but not by its political relevance for the Kingdom of Sardinia’s elite, whereas
the opposite is true for the post-unitary ones. Moreover, tax-collection costs, the regional
political relevance, and tax distortions shaped the growing North-South gap in post-unitary
development, culture, and literacy. We gauge tax distortions with the difference between
the observed land property tax revenues per capita and those that would have prevailed
without Unification and forecasted through pre-unitary estimates. To assess the role of
unobserved heterogeneity, we follow a two-step strategy. First, we control not only for fixed
region effects, but also for energy endowment, population density, income inequality, wages,
and medieval political institutions. Including these controls has little effect on our results.
Second, we build on Altonji et al. (2005), and we calculate that selection on unobservables
would have to be on average about 16 times greater than the influence of observables to
explain away our results. Given the high fit of our regressions, this is unlikely. Finally,
to show that post-unitary tax distortions cannot be considered the acceptable price for the
industrialization of the North, we document that pre-unitary railway diffusion was only
driven by the contemporaneous region’s farming productivity, whereas the post-unitary one
was only shaped by the regional political relevance for the Piedmontese elite.
Our results characterize the crack of the dawn of the North-South divide, and other
more recent factors may have aggravated the disparities arose with Unification (Iuzzolino
et al., 2011). Accordingly, identifying these elements is a key avenue for further research.
More important, our framework can be fruitfully employed to study related cases. Above, we
illustrated how it helps rationalize the evolution of the post-Civil War taxation and outcomes
in the US. A more topical application of our set up could be the analysis of the deep conflicts
that are shaking the European Union nowadays (see also Guiso et al., [2015]).
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary of Variables
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Definition and Sources 1801-1851 1861-1911 ∆
GDP:
Ratio of income in 1861 lire per capita to its 1861 value. Sources: 1.131
Malanima (2006, 2011); Felice and Vasta (2015). (0.341)
Culture:
Ratio of active population share engaged in political, union, and 0.935
religious activities to its 1861 value. Source: SVIMEZ (2011). (0.155)
Illiterates:
Ratio of percentage of illiterates in the total population over the 0.784
Economic age of six to its 1861 value. Source: SVIMEZ (2011). (0.191)
outcomes:
VA-F :
Ratio of value added in the foodstuff sector in millions of 1861 1.242
lire to its 1861 value. Source: Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea (2013). (0.307)
VA-C :
Ratio of value added in the clothing sector in millions of 1861 1.601
lire to its 1861 value. Source: Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea (2013). (0.715)
VA-M :
Ratio of value added in the manufacturing sector in millions of 1.592
1861 lire to its 1861 value. Source: Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea (2013). (0.650)
Land property tax revenues per capita in 1861 lire. Sources: 3.236 3.590 - 0.354
Land-Taxes: Dincecco et al. (2011); Ministero delle Finanze (1863, 1872, 1882, (1.970) (1.187) (0.260)
Tax and 1888); MAIC (1900 and 1912).
policies:
Distortion-LT :
Difference between Land-Taxes and the land property tax revenues 0.360
per capita in 1861 lire forecasted through pre-unitary estimates. (1.753)
Railway:
Railway length in km per square km built in the previous decade. 0.0016 0.0089 - 0.007
Public Sources: SVIMEZ (2011), Romani (1982). (0.0036) (0.0152) (0.002)***
good
provision:
Distortion-R:
Difference between Railway and railway length in km per square 0.001
km built in the previous decade and forecasted through pre-unitary (0.018)
estimates.
Sericulture:
Normalized first principal component extracted from the share of
the region’s surface covered by lakes and rivers and the average 0.306 0.323 - 0.018
growing season precipitation in ml in the previous decade. Sources: (0.239) (0.243) (0.039)
GLWD dataset, http://worldwildlife.org/; Pauling et al. (2006).
Wheat:
Normalized first principal component extracted from the land
Farming suitability for wheat ranging between 0 and 100 and the average 0.281 0.298 - 0.017
technology: growing season precipitation in ml in the previous decade. Sources: (0.199) (0.201) (0.032)
GAEZ dataset, http://www.gaez.iiasa.ac.at; Pauling et al. (2006).
Normalized first principal component extracted from the land
suitability for citrus and olive trees ranging between 0 and 100 0.547 0.532 0.014
Arboriculture: and the average growing season temperature in Celsius degrees (0.192) (0.192) (0.031)
in the previous decade. Sources: GAEZ dataset,
http://www.gaez.iiasa.ac.at; Luterbacher et al. (2004).
War :
Share of previous decade in which the state to which the region 0.004 0.005 - 0.001
belonged partook in external wars. Source: Correlates of War (0.011) (0.010) (0.002)
Other Project, http://www.correlatesofwar.org
drivers of
taxation: Distance in km between the region’s main city and the capital
Distance-to- of the foreign power most adverse to the House of Savoy, i.e., 934.539 803.462 131.077
Enemies: Vienna over the 1801-1813, 1848-1881, and 1901-1914 periods, (311.239) (255.570) (45.599)***
and Paris otherwise. Source: Galasso (2011).
HW-Power :
Horsepower units of hydroelectric and water power production in 2.984
millions of 1861 lire. Source: Missiaia (2012). (3.972)
Population-D: Population per square kilometer. Source: SVIMEZ (2011). 153.091
(146.276)
Other Gini: Gini coefficient. Source: Vecchi (2011). 44.268
controls: (3.160)
Wages:
Ratio of the estimated regional wage based on non tradable goods 0.964
to the Italian average. Source: Felice and Vasta (2015). (0.106)
Ruggedness:
Average terrain ruggedness in Km. Source: G-Econ, 0.292
http://gecon.yale.edu/ (0.082)
Note: 1. Columns (1) and (2) report the mean value and, in parentheses, the standard deviation of each variable over the pre-unitary and
post-unitary sample respectively. Column (3) lists instead the differences between the means of each variable over the pre-unitary
and post-unitary samples and, in parentheses, their standard error. ***, **, and * denote a difference significant at respectively
1%, 5%, and 10% based on a t-test with unequal variances.
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Table 2: High Versus Low Political Relevance Regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1801-1851 sample 1861-1911 sample
High Middle Low High - Low High Middle Low High - Low
Political Relevance Political Relevance
GDP-L:
341.690 347.162 374.523 - 32.833 335.141 358.871 364.347 - 29.206
(29.789) (35.203) (52.041) (14.938)** (84.132) (94.139) (126.063) (40.264)
Culture-L:
0.633 0.725 0.950 - 0.317
(0.052) (0.183) (0.394) (0.069)***
Illiterates-L:
43.467 56.989 70.858 - 27.392
(16.915) (19.348) (13.703) (7.273)***
VA-F-L:
50.127 35.082 30.013 20.114
(11.306) (35.667) (20.900) (5.782)***
VA-C-L:
10.627 11.089 6.073 4.554
(3.472) (9.906) (4.621) (1.613)**
VA-M-L:
180.941 141.121 96.818 84.123
(74.935) (167.627) (76.234) (33.126)**
Land-Taxes:
2.801 2.553 3.992 - 1.191 2.957 3.748 3.537 - 0.580
(0.493) (2.013) (1.831) (0.366)*** (0.729) (1.301) (1.112) (0.351)
Distortion-LT :
- 1.188 0.399 0.580 - 1.767
(0.782) (1.963) (1.533) (0.409)***
Railway:
0.003 0.002 0.0008 0.0024 0.015 0.008 0.009 0.006
(0.006) (0.004) (0.001) (0.0025) (0.036) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
Distortion-R:
0.010 0.004 - 0.003 0.013
(0.036) (0.013) (0.019) (0.015)
Sericulture:
0.396 0.386 0.212 0.185 0.402 0.409 0.223 0.179
(0.027) (0.271) (0.187) (0.033)*** (0.020) (0.268) (0.196) (0.034)***
Wheat:
0.516 0.377 0.146 0.370 0.523 0.402 0.159 0.365
(0.030) (0.207) (0.079) (0.018)*** (0.022) (0.202) (0.087) (0.017)***
Arboriculture:
0.409 0.408 0.708 - 0.299 0.391 0.395 0.695 - 0.304
(0.016) (0.109) (0.140) (0.024)*** (0.012) (0.108) (0.139) (0.024)***
War :
0.009 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.006 - 0.001
(0.023) (0.013) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.004)
Distance-to-Enemy:
640 775.083 1143.083 - 503.083 504 673.694 983.139 - 479.139
(223.471) (197.401) (285.051) (102.860)*** (166.565) (141.714) (231.839) (78.211)***
HW-Power :
2.977 4.537 1.433 1.544
(1.316) (5.223) (1.493) (0.592)**
Population-D:
560.821 92.099 146.128 414.693
(89.603) (46.963) (106.513) (40.660)***
Gini:
45.533 45.142 43.183 2.35
(1.640) (2.255) (3.773) (0.919)**
Wages:
1.006 0.958 0.963 0.043
(0.050) (0.100) (0.118) (0.028)
Ruggedness:
0.250 0.269 0.321 - 0.071
(0) (0.061) (0.096) (0.016)***
Number of observations 6 36 36 6 36 36
Notes: 1. GDP-L, Culture-L, Illiterates-L, VA-F-L, VA-C-L, and VA-M-L label respectively the income per capita, our proxy for culture, the
percentage of illiterates, and the value added in the foodstuff, clothing, and manufacturing sectors (see table 1).
2. Columns (1) to (3) (columns (5) to (7)) report the mean value and, in parentheses, the standard deviation of each variable over
the pre(post)-unitary sample in respectively the high, middle, and low political relevance group, whereas column (4) (column
(8)) displays the difference between the mean of each variable in the high and low political relevance groups over the pre-unitary
(post-unitary) sample and, in parentheses, its standard error. ***, **, and * denote a difference significant at respectively 1%, 5%,
and 10% based on a t-test with unequal variances. The high (low) political relevance cluster includes Veneto (Apulia, Basilicata,
Calabria, Campania, Lazio, and Sicily), whereas the middle one comprehends Abruzzi, Emilia Romagna, Lombardy, Marche,
Tuscany, and Umbria.
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Figure 1: Land Property Taxes, Political Power, and Railway Diffusion
Note: 1. While “Political-Power” is the share of prime ministers born in the region as collected from Corbetta and Piretti (2008), the other
variables are defined in table 1. The North ( South or L) cluster includes Abruzzi, Emilia Romagna, Lombardy, Marche, Tuscany,
Umbria (Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Lazio), and Veneto (Sicily). The M ( H) group comprehends Abruzzi, Emilia
Romagna, Lombardy, Marche, Tuscany, and Umbria (Veneto), whereas the KS one gathers Liguria, Piedmont, and Sardinia.
Figure 2: Culture
Note: 1. “Culture-M” is the average cumulated discounted number of years of activity of Cistercian and Franciscan houses per square km
in every half-century between 1000 and 1600 (see for sources and construction Boranbay and Guerriero, [2016]). The series ending
in North ( South) average the values for Abruzzi, Emilia Romagna, Lombardy, Marche, Tuscany, Umbria (Apulia, Basilicata,
Calabria, Campania, Lazio), and Veneto (Sicily) except for “Culture-M North,” which does not include data for Umbria. In this
case, Umbria is an outlier being the region of origin of Saint Francis and in turn of the Franciscans, which mainly expanded by
building new houses in neighboring areas (Boranbay and Guerriero, 2016).
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Table 3: Endogenous Taxation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1801-1851 sample 1861-1911 sample
The dependent variable is Land-Taxes
Sericulture
- 5.563 2.113 3.329 - 17.520 - 16.236 - 12.214
(11.908) (10.167) (9.552) (16.801) (9.866) (10.131)
Sericulture2
- 2.973 - 3.325 - 3.985 - 16.942 - 13.317 - 15.455
(4.925) (6.290) (7.112) (24.982) (19.208) (20.014)
Wheat
- 3.925 - 5.358 - 3.562 - 24.178 - 13.150 - 13.787
(7.922) (5.880) (6.233) (13.078)* (10.640) (10.065)
Wheat2
16.017 5.302 4.339 41.756 38.242 39.441
(7.166)** (9.440) (9.039) (24.473) (19.221)* (19.536)*
Arboriculture
- 18.717 - 12.255 - 9.523 - 16.440 - 17.200 - 16.899
(7.928)** (5.116)** (4.634)* (23.146) (20.510) (22.270)
Arboriculture2
16.363 11.329 12.519 31.278 32.124 31.377
(6.817)** (4.578)** (7.041)* (23.379) (17.007)* (17.020)*
War
- 13.119 - 11.020 65.296 79.169
(24.637) (30.611) (74.961) (81.546)
War2
612.894 603.872 - 495.358 - 847.463
(404.807) (465.936) (2192.198) (2339.39)
Distance-to-Enemies
0.0016 0.002
(0.0015) (0.001)*
Distance-to-Enemies2
- 6.42E−7 - 6.03E−7
(5.27E−7) (5.61E−7)
Marginal effect of a rise in
Sericulture
- 5.682 1.980 3.169 - 17.859 - 16.503 - 12.523
(11.989) (10.301) (9.667) (16.822) (9.860) (10.003)
Wheat
- 3.605 - 5.252 - 3.475 - 22.508 - 11.620 -12.209
(7.983) (5.932) (6.279) (12.783) (10.665) (9.951)
Arboriculture
- 12.172 - 7.724 - 4.515 - 4.555 - 4.993 - 4.975
(5.669)** (3.505)** (2.600)* (14.779) (16.363) (17.846)
War
- 13.119 - 11.020 60.342 70.694
(24.637) (30.611) (53.258) (58.365)
Distance-to-Enemies
0.0008 0.0012
(0.0008) (0.0006)**
Estimation Fixed Region Effects OLS
R2 0.21 0.28 0.30 0.19 0.44 0.45
Number of observations 78 78 78 78 78 78
Notes: 1. Standard errors allowing for clustering by region in parentheses. *** labels significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
2. The marginal effects of a rise in Sericulture, Wheat, and War are calculated for an increase from their lowest South’s value, i.e.,
0.02, 0.01, and 0 (0.01, 0.02, 0.005) in the pre(post)-unitary sample. Those of a rise in Arboriculture and Distance-to-Enemies are
calculated for an increase from their lowest North’s value, i.e., 0.2 and 633 (0.19 and 504) in the pre(post)-unitary sample.
Figure 3: The Rise of the North-South Divide
Note: 1. “VA-F-N,” “Culture-N,” and “Illiterates-N” are respectively VA-F-L, Culture-L, and Illiterates-L normalized in such a way that
their means for Italy in 1861 equal one (see table 2). The H ( L) group comprehends Veneto (Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria,
Campania, Lazio, and Sicily). The M cluster includes Abruzzi, Emilia Romagna, Lombardy, Marche, Tuscany, and Umbria.
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Table 4: The Rise of the North-South Divide
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. The dependent variable is:
GDP Culture Illiterates VA-F VA-C VA-M
War
- 33.293 - 6.046 32.667 - 8.312 - 15.307 - 31.970
(14.403)** (5.789) (9.716)*** (18.036) (33.142) (45.739)
War2
858.797 323.176 - 791.892 - 106.208 - 296.275 202.088
(438.233)* (170.550)* (285.181)** (538.006) (970.158) (1344.844)
P-value for farming productivity [0.00] [0.05] [0.00] [0.24] [0.06] [0.24]
Marginal effect of a rise in
War
- 24.705 - 2.814 24.749 - 9.374 - 18.270 - 29.949
(10.085)** (4.112) (6.878)*** (12.708) (23.558) (32.330)
Estimation Fixed Region Effects OLS
R2 0.51 0.17 0.71 0.33 0.41 0.40
Number of observations 78 78 78 78 78 78
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel B. The dependent variable is:
GDP Culture Illiterates VA-F VA-C VA-M
Distance-to-Enemies
- 0.0002 - 0.0001 - 0.00020 - 0.0001 0.0001 - 3.47E−6
(0.0001)* (0.0001) (0.00004)*** (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
P-value for farming productivity [0.00] [0.18] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Estimation Fixed Region Effects OLS
R2 0.45 0.09 0.48 0.21 0.30 0.27
Number of observations 78 78 78 78 78 78
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel C. The dependent variable is:
GDP Culture Illiterates VA-F VA-C VA-M
Distortion-LT
- 0.114 0.057 0.104 - 0.233 - 0.389 - 0.516
(0.044)** (0.036) (0.024)*** (0.037)*** (0.084)*** (0.070)***
P-value for farming productivity [0.00] [0.47] [0.01] [0.05] [0.00] [0.00]
Estimation Fixed Region Effects OLS
R2 0.55 0.20 0.71 0.63 0.52 0.70
Number of observations 78 78 78 78 78 78
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel D. The dependent variable is:
GDP Culture Illiterates VA-F VA-C VA-M
War
- 36.950 - 13.099 25.707 3.951 6.740 1.111
(14.122)** (6.137)** (7.733)*** (15.312) (27.135) (27.148)
War2
1050.318 444.948 - 699.711 - 165.929 - 478.867 - 76.016
(380.147)** (204.899)** (207.029)*** (403.550) (717.284) (727.375)
Distance-to-Enemies
- 0.0004 - 0.0001 - 0.00004 - 0.0002 - 0.0002 - 0.0002
(0.0001)*** (0.0001)** (0.00004) (0.0001)** (0.0002) (0.0002)
Distortion-LT
- 0.090 0.052 0.077 - 0.229 - 0.344 - 0.512
(0.051)* (0.033) (0.028)** (0.050)*** (0.108)*** (0.100)***
P-value for farming productivity [0.00] [0.19] [0.01] [0.07] [0.01] [0.04]
Marginal effect of a rise in
War
- 26.447 - 8.650 18.710 2.292 1.952 0.351
(10.403)** (4.139)* (5.694)*** (11.335) (20.065) (19.977)
Estimation Fixed Region Effects OLS
R2 0.62 0.25 0.81 0.64 0.53 0.70
Number of observations 78 78 78 78 78 78
Notes: 1. Standard errors allowing for clustering by region in parentheses. *** labels significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
2. The proxies for farming productivity are Sericulture, Wheat, and Arboriculture.
3. The marginal effect of a rise in War is calculated for an increase from its post-unitary mean 0.005.
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Table 5: The Rise of the North-South Divide — Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. The dependent variable is:
GDP Culture Illiterates VA-F VA-C VA-M
War
- 35.704 - 12.529 25.179 4.589 10.442 7.066
(13.151)** (5.875)** (7.634)*** (14.876) (26.489) (25.093)
War2
987.817 416.363 - 673.261 - 197.923 - 664.559 - 374.756
(345.185)** (181.718)** (198.100)*** (384.194) (695.866) (671.662)
Distance-to-Enemies
- 0.0004 - 0.0001 - 0.00004 - 0.0002 - 0.0002 - 0.0002
(0.0001)*** (0.0001)* (0.00004) (0.0001)** (0.0001) (0.0001)*
Distortion-LT
- 0.060 0.060 0.065 - 0.214 - 0.256 - 0.371
(0.063) (0.030)* (0.034)* (0.065)*** (0.157) (0.103)***
HW-Power
0.015 0.007 - 0.006 0.007 0.043 0.070
(0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.025) (0.015)***
P-value for farming productivity [0.00] [0.17] [0.00] [0.09] [0.01] [0.03]
Marginal effect of a rise in
War
- 25.826 - 8.366 18.447 2.609 3.796 3.318
(9.800)** (4.102)* (5.690)*** (11.100) (19.732) (18.451)
Estimation Fixed Region Effects OLS
R2 0.64 0.27 0.82 0.65 0.56 0.79
Number of observations 78 78 78 78 78 78
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel B. The dependent variable is:
GDP Culture Illiterates VA-F VA-C VA-M
War
- 33.261 - 10.158 21.851 11.319 23.438 15.058
(9.882)*** (7.828) (7.086)*** (11.352) (23.367) (19.774)
War2
974.025 384.113 - 619.957 - 318.329 - 824.223 - 364.484
(300.216)*** (249.103) (193.619)*** (301.087) (645.350) (561.905)
Distance-to-Enemies
- 0.0004 - 0.0001 - 0.00004 - 0.0002 - 0.0002 - 0.0002
(0.0001)*** (0.0001)* (0.00004) (0.0001)*** (0.0001) (0.0001)
Distortion-LT
- 0.076 0.063 0.062 - 0.201 - 0.279 - 0.458
(0.066) (0.041) (0.030)* (0.059)*** (0.143)* (0.118)***
Population-D
0.001 0.001 - 0.0012 0.002 0.005 0.004
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0004)*** (0.001) (0.005) (0.003)
P-value for farming productivity [0.00] [0.14] [0.00] [0.10] [0.05] [0.13]
Marginal effect of a rise in
War
- 23.521 - 6.316 15.651 8.136 15.196 11.414
(7.001)*** (5.377) (5.185)** (8.421) (17.018) (14.362)
Estimation Fixed Region Effects OLS
R2 0.63 0.28 0.84 0.68 0.57 0.73
Number of observations 78 78 78 78 78 78
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel C. The dependent variable is:
GDP Culture Illiterates VA-F VA-C VA-M
War
- 43.865 - 7.678 23.231 5.733 3.586 5.303
(18.342)** (6.882) (8.282)** (18.303) (40.836) (34.085)
War2
1264.955 276.684 - 622.857 - 221.240 - 380.952 - 206.138
(497.536)** (217.788) (225.308)** (499.649) (1132.655) (941.564)
Distance-to-Enemies
- 0.0003 - 0.0002 4.92E−6 - 0.0002 - 0.0001 - 0.0003
(0.0001)** (0.0001)** (0.00003) (0.0001)* (0.0004) (0.0002)
Distortion-LT
- 0.082 0.046 0.080 - 0.231 - 0.340 - 0.517
(0.061) (0.030) (0.026)*** (0.054)*** (0.127)** (0.107)***
Gini
0.019 - 0.015 0.007 - 0.005 0.009 - 0.012
(0.011)* (0.009) (0.004) (0.013) (0.046) (0.027)
P-value for farming productivity [0.27] [0.75] [0.01] [0.35] [0.23] [0.19]
Marginal effect of a rise in
War
- 31.215 - 4.911 17.002 3.520 - 0.224 3.242
(13.432)** (4.742) (6.051)** (13.362) (29.570) (24.753)
Estimation Fixed Region Effects OLS
R2 0.65 0.32 0.82 0.65 0.53 0.71
Number of observations 78 78 78 78 78 78
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel D. The dependent variable is:
GDP Culture Illiterates VA-F VA-C VA-M
War
- 32.414 - 12.447 23.783 6.638 8.526 6.654
(11.352)** (4.961)** (7.162)*** (14.352) (26.140) (26.077)
War2
854.072 416.751 - 616.461 - 282.201 - 556.118 - 315.868
(306.926)** (151.299)** (193.776)*** (380.063) (681.440) (699.123)
Distance-to-Enemies
- 0.0004 - 0.0001 - 0.00005 - 0.0002 - 0.0001 - 0.0002
(0.0001)*** (0.0001)** (0.00004) (0.0001)** (0.0002) (0.0002)
Distortion-LT
- 0.086 0.053 0.075 - 0.227 - 0.342 - 0.507
(0.040)** (0.030)* (0.024)*** (0.047)*** (0.106)*** (0.085)***
Wages
0.822 0.118 - 0.349 0.487 0.324 1.004
(0.230)*** (0.374) (0.160)** (0.436) (0.684) (0.479)*
P-value for farming productivity [0.00] [0.16] [0.01] [0.09] [0.01] [0.01]
Marginal effect of a rise in
War
- 23.874 - 8.280 17.618 3.816 2.964 3.495
(8.360)** (3.497)** (5.262)*** (10.638) (19.460) (19.192)
Estimation Fixed Region Effects OLS
R2 0.65 0.25 0.83 0.65 0.53 0.71
Number of observations 78 78 78 78 78 78
Notes: 1. Standard errors allowing for clustering by region in parentheses. *** labels significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
2. The proxies for farming productivity are Sericulture, Wheat, and Arboriculture.
3. The marginal effect of a rise in War is calculated for an increase from its post-unitary mean 0.005.
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Table 6: Using Selection on Observables to Assess the Bias from Unobservables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
The dependent variable is:
Land-Taxes GDP Culture Illiterates VA-F VA-C VA-M
The ratio is calculated for the variable:
Sericulture
Sericulture2
Arboriculture 3.486
Arboriculture2 10.520
War 28.655 21.981 47.688 7.193 2.821 1.187
War2 15.805 14.566 25.454 6.186 3.579 1.254
Distance-to-Enemies 1.500 41 12 21 98.500 16 23
Distance-to-Enemies2 2.741
Distortion-LT 2 4.714 5.417 14.267 6.327 2.631
The extra controls in the full set are
NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO{Sericulture, Sericulture2, Wheat, Wheat2,
Arboriculture, Arboriculture2, War, War2},
{Distance-to-Enemies, Distance-to-Enemies2}, YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
{HW-Power}. NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: 1. The indexes listed in column (1) (columns (2) to (8)) are obtained from regressions run on the pre(post)-unitary sample.
2. Each cell reports an index constructed as explained in section 5.4.2 and based on the coefficients attached to the relevant variable
and obtained from two regressions, one with a “restricted set” of covariates and another with a “full set” of covariates. The
regressors included in the restricted sets of covariates are: 1. those incorporated in the specification reported in column (2) of
table 3 in the case of column (1) of the present table; 2. Distance-to-Enemies, Distance-to-Enemies2, and region fixed effects in
the case of column (2) of the present table; 3. those considered in panel D of table 4 in the cases of columns (3) to (8) of the
present table. The extra variables, possibly included in the full set of covariates, are listed in the last three rows of the present
table. The sample size is always 78.
Table 7: Endogenous Public Good Provision
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1801-1851 sample 1861-1911 sample
The dependent variable is Railway
Sericulture
- 0.165 - 0.126 - 0.139 - 0.356 - 0.397 - 0.404
(0.085)* (0.084) (0.087) (0.330) (0.337) (0.340)
Sericulture2
0.058 0.070 0.069 0.240 0.236 0.234
(0.037) (0.036)* (0.038)* (0.224) (0.230) (0.225)
Wheat
0.177 0.172 0.172 0.040 0.129 0.218
(0.081)** (0.077)** (0.078)** (0.303) (0.321) (0.319)
Wheat2
- 0.037 - 0.113 - 0.111 - 0.322 - 0.341 - 0.396
(0.045) (0.049)** (0.049)** (0.247) (0.257) (0.254)
Arboriculture
- 0.077 - 0.049 - 0.078 0.083 0.055 - 0.091
(0.082) (0.080) (0.083) (0.302) (0.307) (0.324)
Arboriculture2
0.152 0.101 0.136 0.121 0.085 0.137
(0.065)** (0.063) (0.074)* (0.277) (0.295) (0.291)
War
0.357 0.312 - 0.958 - 1.150
(0.397) (0.428) (1.087) (1.072)
War2
- 2.184 - 1.896 22.050 27.382
(5.695) (6.082) (29.122) (28.748)
Distance-to-Enemies
- 9.22E−6 - 0.0001
(9.95E−6) (0.00005)*
Distance-to-Enemies2
5.14E−9 4.35E−8
(4.07E−9) (2.24E−8)*
P-value for Ruggedness
× decade dummies [0.52] [0.90] [0.79] [0.92] [0.93] [0.99]
Marginal effect of a rise in
Sericulture
- 0.162 - 0.124 - 0.136 - 0.351 - 0.392 - 0.400
(0.085)* (0.084) (0.087) (0.330) (0.336) (0.339)
Wheat
0.176 0.170 0.169 0.027 0.115 0.203
(0.081)** (0.077)** (0.078)** (0.301) (0.319) (0.317)
Arboriculture
- 0.016 - 0.008 - 0.024 0.129 0.087 - 0.039
(0.082) (0.079) (0.081) (0.274) (0.281) (0.297)
War
0.357 0.312 - 0.737 - 0.876
(0.397) (0.428) (0.807) (0.796)
Distance-to-Enemies
- 2.70E−6 - 0.0001
(5.65E−6) (0.00003)**
Estimation Fixed Region Effects OLS
R2 0.71 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.79
Number of observations 78 78 78 78 78 78
Notes: 1. Standard errors allowing for clustering by region in parentheses. *** labels significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
2. The marginal effects of a rise in Sericulture, Wheat, and War are calculated for an increase from their lowest South’s value, i.e.,
0.02, 0.01, and 0 (0.01, 0.02, 0.005) in the pre(post)-unitary sample. Those of a rise in Arboriculture and Distance-to-Enemies are
calculated for an increase from their lowest North’s value, i.e., 0.2 and 633 (0.19 and 504) in the pre(post)-unitary sample.
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Figure 4: The Case of the American Civil War
Note: 1. “Taxes-to-GDP-Ratio” (“GDP-N”) is collected from Secretary of the Interior (1850, 1860, 1870, 1880) (Lindert and Williamson,
2013; Klein, 2013) and represents the ratio of total taxes to GDP (GDP in 1860 dollars per capita normalized in such a way that
its mean over the sample in 1850 is one). “Taxed-Property-N” (“Taxed-Real-Estate-N”) is collected from Secretary of the Interior
(1850, 1860, 1870, 1880) and represents the assessed valuation of taxed real and personal property (real estate and improvements)
per capita in 1860 dollars normalized in such a way that its mean over the sample in 1850 is one. The Pro-Union ( Confederate)
group includes Colorado, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia), and Washington (West Virginia).
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APPENDIX (FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION)
Establishing the Exogeneity of War
Next, we explain why War should be correctly considered exogenous.
Austro-Sardinian War
“Since his accession to the throne, Charles Albert worked to restore [his] preeminence in Italy.
In his mind, the enemy was Austria” [Paoletti 2008, p. 95], and the Spring of Nations became the
“opportunity [he] had waited earnestly” [Paoletti 2008, p. 94]. Once the revolutionaries expelled
the Austrians from Milan in March 1848, he “moved his troops into Lombardy” [Killinger 2002, p.
107]. “The Italian population enthusiastically supported [the Kingdom of Sardinia’s] intervention”
[Paoletti 2008, p. 96] knowing that the Austrian army “could not get reinforcements [. . . ] because
of the revolution in Vienna” [Paoletti 2008, p. 96]. Lacking an autonomous foreign policy, the
Italian rules first joined the conflict scared by the threat of internal unrests and then immediately
abandoned it as soon as Austria tamed the turmoils in Vienna (Killinger, 2002). As a result, the
Kingdom of Sardinia was constrained to sign a truce in July 1848. Hence, all the pre-unitary states’
actions were ultimately driven by the strategic moves of either the Kingdom of Sardinia or Austria.
Roman Republic War
Despite the fact that Pope Pius IX had granted his own constitution on February 14 1848, the
radical liberals expelled him in the aftermath of the truce the Kingdom of Sardinia reached with
Austria and declared in November 1848 the Roman Republic. This decision ignited the reactions
of the conservative elite and of Catholic powers who sought to restore Pope’s rule. In particular,
“in a politically calculated attempt to win support of French Catholics, Louis Napoleon ordered
his armies to restore the Pope to power” [Killinger 2002, p. 109]. Meanwhile, Austria defeated the
Kingdom of Sardinia in Novara on March 1849, reinstating its power over Italy. In June 1849 a
French force invaded the Papal State and defeated the “weak and ill-equipped [Roman Republican
army]” [Riall 2009, p. 23] . Again, none of the pre-unitary elites could shape the fate of the conflict.
Neapolitan and Italian-Roman Wars
In the aftermath of the 1848 unrests, the Bourbons “concentrated all [their effort] on domestic
affairs. [The] army was now intended to be more of a large, well-armed constabulary force” [Paoletti
2008, p. 102]. As a result, after the royal forces crushed a revolt in Palermo, “Francesco Crispi, one
of the revolutionaries, urged Garibaldi to intervene” [Paoletti 2008, p. 110] sure that the Bourbons
could be overturned. Garibaldi assembled a group of volunteers, who departed from Genoa and
reached Sicily in May 1860. Their arrival ignited a large scale revolt to which the Bourbons did
not react because scared by “an interposition by US, French, and British” [Paoletti 2008, p. 110].
Garibaldi’s swift conquest of Sicily worried the European powers and the Kingdom of Sardinia “that
the guerrilla leader might move on Naples, Rome, and Venice” [Killinger 2002, p. 116]. Garibaldi’s
conquest of Naples confirmed these suspects and forced Victor Emanuel II to try to stop him before
he could put the independence at jeopardy (Paoletti, 2008). With French approval, Kingdom of
Sardinia’s forces moved into the Papal State in September 1860 firing up the Italian-Roman War.
The conflict ended a few months later with the Kingdom of Sardinia’s conquest of Marche and
Umbria and the meeting between Garibaldi and Victor Emanuel II, who was then proclaimed King
of Italy (Killinger, 2002). All in all, it is clear that both wars were guided by the expansionist aims
of the Kingdom of Sardinia and the French foreign policy and only barely modulated by the—lack
of—adequate reactions by both the Kingdom of Two Sicilies and the Papal State.
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Seven Weeks War
“In 1866, Prusso-Austrian competition for supremacy in Germany reached its zenith. Prussian
chancellor Otto von Bismarck forced Austria to declare war on Prussia. [In] Bismarck’s opinion
[. . . ], it was better to have Italy as an ally, because it prevented Austria from concentrating its
entire army against Prussia” [Paoletti 2008, p. 117]. Involved in this conflict, the Kingdom of Italy
bore a series of grim defeats until Prussia’s victory and the consequent armistice left it alone on
the battlefront; at that point “Italy had no choice but accept [the end of the war], or face Austria
alone” [Paoletti 2008, p. 118]. As a result of the Peace of Prague, Italy gained control of Venice. All
in all, the Kingdom of Italy did not control either the timing of the war nor any of its consequences.
Supplementary Tables
Table I: Summary of Variables
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Definition and Sources 1801-1851 1861-1911 ∆
Ratio of gross saleable annual farming product per employee, 1.123
Agriculture: normalized in such a way that its mean for Italy in 1861 is 100, (0.278)
to its 1861 value. Source: Federico (2007).
Life:
Ratio of life expectancy in years to its 1861 value. Source: 1.166
Felice and Vasta (2015). (0.176)
Height:
Ratio of the height of conscripted workers in cm to its 1861 1.007
value. Source: Vecchi (2011). (0.006)
Ratio of value added in the foodstuff sector in millions of 1861 1.016
VAP-F : lire per capita to its 1861 value. Source: Ciccarelli and (0.170)
Economic Fenoaltea (2013).
outcomes:
Ratio of value added in the clothing sector in millions of 1861 1.277
VAP-C : lire per capita to its 1861 value. Source: Ciccarelli and (0.387)
Fenoaltea (2013).
Ratio of value added in the manufacturing sector in millions 1.273
VAP-M : of 1861 lire per capita to its 1861 value. Source: Ciccarelli (0.354)
and Fenoaltea (2013).
Pop-Density: Ratio of the population density to its 1861 value. Source: 1.220
SVIMEZ (2011). (0.193)
Land-Taxes-K :
Land property tax revenues per square km of arable land in 456.181 711.812 - 255.631
1861 lire. Source: see text. (342.565) (384.877) (58.340)***
Tax
policies:
Distortion-LT-K :
Difference between Land-Taxes-K and land property tax 132.841
revenues per square km of arable land in 1861 lire forecasted (477.206)
through pre-unitary estimates.
Citrus:
Normalized first principal component extracted from the land
suitability for citrus ranging between 0 and 100 and the 0.678 0.654 0.024
average growing season temperature in Celsius degrees in the (0.200) (0.200) (0.032)
previous decade. Sources: see text.
Farming
technology:
Olive:
Normalized first principal component extracted from the land
suitability for olives ranging between 0 and 100 and the 0.453 0.432 0.021
average growing season temperature in Celsius degrees in the (0.221) (0.221) (0.035)
previous decade. Sources: see text.
Share of years from the Congress of Vienna in which the state 0.001 0.008 - 0.007
War-C : to which the region belonged partook in external wars. Source: (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)***
Correlates of War Project, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/
Other
drivers of (Average) distance in km between the region’s main city and
taxation: Istanbul between 1801 and 1815 (Amsterdam, Copenhagen,
Distance- and Istanbul between 1816 and 1882 and Amsterdam, 1365.803 1465.145 - 99.342
to-Enemies-P: Copenhagen, Istanbul, Lisbon, and Madrid between 1883 (156.292) (149.035) (24.453)***
and 1914). Source: Galasso (2011).
Other
Democracy-M :
Constraints on the elite’s power averaged over the 1000-1600 1.982
controls: period. Source: Boranbay and Guerriero (2016). (1.023)
Note: 1. Columns (1) and (2) report the mean value and, in parentheses, the standard deviation of each variable over the pre-unitary and
post-unitary sample respectively. Column (3) lists instead the differences between the means of each variable over the pre-unitary
and post-unitary samples and, in parentheses, their standard error. ***, **, and * denote a difference significant at respectively
1%, 5%, and 10% based on a t-test with unequal variances.
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Table II: High Versus Low Political Relevance Regions — Further Evidence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1801-1851 sample 1861-1911 sample
High Middle Low High - Low High Middle Low High - Low
Political Relevance Political Relevance
Agriculture-L:
66.567 80.706 96.644 - 30.078
(18.190) (17.071) (27.803) (8.753)***
Life-L:
41.133 38.144 35.706 5.428
(6.826) (5.064) (5.365) (2.927)
Height-L:
166.079 163.709 161.656 4.423
(0.805) (1.429) (1.385) (0.402)***
VAP-F-L:
0.017 0.015 0.016 0.001
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
VAP-C-L:
0.003 0.005 0.003 0.0002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0003)
VAP-M-L:
0.058 0.058 0.050 0.009
(0.015) (0.030) (0.016) (0.007)
Land-Taxes-K :
638.840 411.770 470.149 168.692 981.036 814.120 564.633 416.403
(163.337) (336.458) (364.976) (90.259)* (171.793) (389.399) (352.942) (91.537)***
Distortion-LT-K :
- 155.922 - 169.652 483.460 - 639.382
(204.304) (429.894) (274.533) (95.133)***
Citrus:
0.449 0.539 0.856 - 0.407 0.415 0.515 0.833 - 0.418
(0.030) (0.139) (0.086) (0.019)*** (0.022) (0.137) (0.085) (0.017)***
Olive:
0.250 0.297 0.642 - 0.392 0.221 0.277 0.622 - 0.401
(0.025) (0.106) (0.166) (0.029)*** (0.018) (0.105) (0.165) (0.028)***
War-C :
0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.013 0.007 0.008 0.005
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)***
Distance-to-Enemy-P:
1260.444 1353.519 1395.648 - 135.204 1304.356 1374.415 1582.674 - 278.319
(135.985) (119.544) (183.938) (63.418)* (102.006) (90.271) (110.105) (45.508)***
Democracy-M :
3.846 2.551 1.103 2.744
(0) (0.724) (0.233) (0.039)***
Number of observations 6 36 36 6 36 36
Notes: 1. Agriculture-L, Life-L, Height-L, VAP-F-L, VAP-C-L, and VAP-M-L label respectively the saleable annual farming product per
employee, the life expectancy, the height of conscripted workers, and the value added per capita in the foodstuff, clothing, and
manufacturing sectors (see table 1).
2. Columns (1) to (3) (columns (5) to (7)) report the mean value and, in parentheses, the standard deviation of each variable over
the pre(post)-unitary sample in respectively the high, middle, and low political relevance group, whereas column (4) (column
(8)) displays the difference between the mean of each variable in the high and low political relevance groups over the pre-unitary
(post-unitary) sample and, in parentheses, its standard error. ***, **, and * denote a difference significant at respectively 1%, 5%,
and 10% based on a t-test with unequal variances. The high (low) political relevance cluster includes Veneto (Apulia, Basilicata,
Calabria, Campania, Lazio, and Sicily), whereas the middle one comprehends Abruzzi, Emilia Romagna, Lombardy, Marche,
Tuscany, and Umbria.
Table III: Employing Land Property Taxes per Square km of Arable Land
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
The dependent variable is:
Land-Taxes-K GDP Culture Illiterates VA-F VA-C VA-M
Sericulture
717.829 - 2043.419
(1444.396) (2936.172)
Sericulture2
- 705.872 201.020
(697.323) (4224.701)
Wheat
- 695.852 - 3483.72
(1357.697) (2086.138)
Wheat2
393.352 4755.859
(663.209) (3806.91)
Arboriculture
- 2843.775 - 4395.597
(1288.652)** (4920.322)
Arboriculture2
2518.692 5332.121
(1223.522)* (3681.954)
War
6136.935 7283.011 - 42.588 - 9.608 30.504 - 8.913 - 17.889 - 26.691
(3921.993) (16273.98) (12.481)*** (5.340)* (8.459)*** (13.394) (29.660) (28.695)
War2
29613.64 - 93223.13 1116.142 402.957 - 755.537 - 24.271 - 173.949 224.368
(60173.87) (469975.6) (366.818)*** (169.653)** (243.952)*** (384.912) (846.861) (834.385)
Distance-to-Enemies
0.336 0.638 - 0.0004 - 0.0001 - 0.00004 - 0.0002 - 0.0002 - 0.0002
(0.241) (0.226)** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)* (0.00005) (0.0001)** (0.0002) (0.0001)
Distance-to-Enemies2
- 0.00009 - 0.0002
(0.00009) (0.0001)*
Distortion-LT-K
- 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 - 0.0009 - 0.0007 - 0.002
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001)* (0.0003)*** (0.0007) (0.001)***
Estimation Fixed Region Effects OLS
R2 0.73 0.24 0.59 0.20 0.75 0.51 0.43 0.58
Number of observations 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78
Notes: 1. While the first column is based on pre-unitary data, the other columns are built on post-unitary data.
2. Standard errors allowing for clustering by region in parentheses. *** labels significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
3. The specifications in columns (3) to (8) also incorporate Sericulture, Wheat, and Arboriculture.
48
Table IV: Cross-Validating the Proxies for the Regional Productivity
Sericulture 0.24**
Wheat 0.21*
Citrus 0.31***
Olive 0.53***
Arboriculture 0.16 0.49***
Silk-P Wheat-P Citrus-P Olive-P
Notes: 1. Silk-P (Wheat-P) represents the production of silk (wheat) in kg (hectoliters) per kg of silkworm incubated (cultivated hectare),
whereas Citrus-P (Olive-P) is the number of citrus fruits (production of olive oil in hectoliters) per tree (cultivated hectare). All
these variables are collected from MAIC (1864, 1881, 1892, 1900, and 1912).
2. The entries are partial correlations obtained removing decade fixed effects. *** labels significant at the 1% confidence level; **,
5%; *, 10%. The sample consists of 78 observations.
Table V: Alternative Proxies for Regional Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1801-1851 sample 1861-1911 sample
The dependent variable is Land-Taxes
Sericulture
0.650 - 2.146 - 12.387 - 14.177
(10.535) (7.980) (11.415) (10.775)
Sericulture2
- 3.258 - 2.114 - 12.516 - 15.129
(7.282) (5.962) (17.246) (19.821)
Wheat
- 1.924 0.172 - 11.619 - 10.710
(6.608) (5.973) (10.220) (9.826)
Wheat2
4.169 3.131 39.744 39.874
(9.554) (8.188) (17.313)** (19.399)*
Citrus
- 6.438 10.272
(3.438)* (17.176)
Citrus2
5.872 - 1.971
(3.295)* (15.455)
Olive
- 11.272 - 0.306
(4.105)** (10.265)
Olive2
13.637 12.823
(6.388)* (14.135)
War
- 11.335 - 6.096 86.308 71.156
(30.214) (32.073) (90.928) (89.638)
War2
611.169 503.68 - 1126.66 - 638.227
(472.460) (497.178) (2594.714) (2567.808)
Distance-to-Enemies
0.001 0.0008 0.003 0.002
(0.001) (0.0011) (0.001)* (0.001)*
Distance-to-Enemies2
- 5.11E−7 - 2.80E−7 - 1.02E−6 - 8.82E−7
(4.53E−7) (3.80E−7) (6.25E−7) (5.77E−7)
Estimation Fixed Region Effects OLS
R2 0.30 0.35 0.44 0.45
Number of observations 78 78 78 78
Note: 1. Standard errors allowing for clustering by region in parentheses. *** labels significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
Table VI: An Alternative Proxy for the Marginal Tax-collection Costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
The dependent variable is:
Land-Taxes GDP Culture Illiterates VA-F VA-C VA-M
Sericulture
1.081 2.004
(9.679) (9.114)
Sericulture2
- 3.990 - 5.869
(6.800) (12.079)
Wheat
- 2.808 - 17.101
(6.204) (9.339)*
Wheat2
5.687 20.565
(8.954) (11.704)*
Arboriculture
- 10.874 - 36.558
(4.667)** (13.052)**
Arboriculture2
14.475 14.934
(6.909)* (14.108)
War-C
- 13.672 648.881 - 223.365 169.987 40.888 - 201.454 - 641.306 - 419.023
(114.461) (212.566)*** (115.775)* (45.129)*** (41.133) (84.890)** (253.295)** (179.805)**
War-C2
5728.218 - 9281.457 5270.58 - 7309.777 751.291 6754.012 22761.05 12736.65
(6117.573) (11533.590) (4055.205) (1684.091)*** (1338.027) (2792.416)** (8297.393)** (5836.71)**
Distance-to-Enemies
0.002 0.0007 - 0.0004 - 0.00007 - 0.00010 - 0.0003 - 0.0003 - 0.0004
(0.001) (0.0008) (0.0001)*** (0.00006) (0.00003)*** (0.00006)*** (0.0002)* (0.0001)***
Distance-to-Enemies2
- 5.84E−7 - 1.49E−7
(5.34E−7) (3.87E−7)
Distortion-LT-K
0.056 0.017 0.021 - 0.136 - 0.107 - 0.274
(0.092) (0.025) (0.044) (0.081) (0.173) (0.143)*
Estimation Fixed Region Effects OLS
R2 0.29 0.73 0.70 0.49 0.82 0.71 0.65 0.77
Number of observations 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78
Notes: 1. While the first column is based on pre-unitary data, the other columns are built on post-unitary data.
2. Standard errors allowing for clustering by region in parentheses. *** labels significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
3. The specifications in columns (3) to (8) also incorporate Sericulture, Wheat, and Arboriculture.
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Table VII: Endogenous Taxation and the Rise of the North-South Divide — Placebo
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
The dependent variable is:
Land-Taxes GDP Culture Illiterates VA-F VA-C VA-M
Sericulture
1.621 - 19.392
(6.409) (15.168)
Sericulture2
- 2.138 - 18.013
(6.246) (20.059)
Wheat
- 4.591 - 6.112
(4.270) (16.215)
Wheat2
4.195 42.563
(9.054) (19.669)**
Arboriculture
5.040 - 18.570
(6.947) (21.209)
Arboriculture2
- 7.134 36.544
(7.187) (17.724)*
War
- 13.073 - 2.422 - 25.124 - 21.778 20.928 3.954 9.901 7.082
(25.268) (130.331) (13.928)* (9.468)** (10.629)* (18.104) (40.704) (31.352)
War2
602.458 1244.548 764.431 637.929 - 592.569 - 173.885 - 557.020 - 220.867
(425.588) (3387.64) (379.444)* (258.981)** (269.120)** (474.466) (998.562) (806.121)
Distance-to-Enemies-P
- 0.002 - 0.023 0.00003 - 0.0008 - 0.0004 - 0.0004 - 0.0001 - 7.06E−6
(0.003) (0.019) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.001) (0.001)
Distance-to-Enemies-P2
3.33E−7 6.69E−6
(1.04E−6) (6.55E−6)
Distortion-LT-K
- 0.102 0.042 0.072 - 0.238 - 0.349 - 0.518
(0.053)* (0.032) (0.026)** (0.051)*** (0.107)*** (0.100)***
Estimation Fixed Region Effects OLS
R2 0.42 0.47 0.58 0.27 0.82 0.64 0.53 0.70
Number of observations 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78
Notes: 1. While the first column is based on pre-unitary data, the other columns are built on post-unitary data.
2. Standard errors allowing for clustering by region in parentheses. *** labels significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
3. The specifications in columns (3) to (8) also incorporate Sericulture, Wheat, and Arboriculture.
Table VIII: Allowing for Spatial Correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
The dependent variable is:
Land-Taxes GDP Culture Illiterates VA-F VA-C VA-M
Sericulture
3.329 - 12.214
(6.554) (8.090)
Sericulture2
- 3.985 -15.455
(4.679) (17.373)
Wheat
- 3.562 - 13.787
(4.538) (5.497)***
Wheat2
4.339 39.441
(5.933) (17.221)**
Arboriculture
- 9.523 - 16.899
(4.125)** (14.889)
Arboriculture2
12.519 31.377
(6.855)* (10.685)***
War
- 11.020 79.169 - 36.950 - 13.099 25.707 3.951 6.740 1.111
(30.902) (70.326) (12.076)*** (4.926)** (5.373)*** (12.720) (18.287) (19.847)
War2
603.872 - 847.463 1050.319 444.948 - 699.711 - 165.929 - 478.867 - 76.016
(483.087) (2005.941) (330.384)*** (175.653)** (152.567)*** (337.475) (473.246) (532.983)
Distance-to-Enemies
0.002 0.002 - 0.0004 - 0.00012 - 0.00004 - 0.0002 - 0.0002 - 0.0002
(0.001) (0.001)** (0.0001)*** (0.00004)*** (0.00003) (0.0001)** (0.0002) (0.0002)
Distance-to-Enemies2
- 6.42E−7 - 6.03E−7
(3.90E−7)*** (3.52E−7)*
Distortion-LT-K
- 0.090 0.052 0.077 - 0.229 - 0.344 - 0.512
(0.039)** (0.033) (0.026)** (0.034)*** (0.068)*** (0.074)***
Estimation Fixed Region Effects OLS
Number of observations 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78
Notes: 1. While the first column is based on pre-unitary data, the other columns are built on post-unitary data.
2. Conley’s (1999) standard errors in parentheses. *** labels significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
3. The specifications in columns (3) to (8) also incorporate Sericulture, Wheat, and Arboriculture.
50
Table IX: Focusing on the 1871-1911 Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
The dependent variable is:
Land-Taxes GDP Culture Illiterates VA-F VA-C VA-M
Sericulture
- 21.663
(15.532)
Sericulture2
- 9.074
(19.508)
Wheat
- 7.475
(14.131)
Wheat2
30.640
(20.588)
Arboriculture
- 1.882
(17.645)
Arboriculture2
38.824
(13.925)**
War
10.142 - 15.106 - 5.042 6.792 14.503 52.084 50.324
(43.295) (10.205) (5.988) (1.910)*** (4.941)** (43.276) (18.601)**
Distance-to-Enemies
0.003 - 0.0004 - 0.0001 - 0.00004 - 0.0002 - 0.0001 - 0.0001
(0.001)** (0.0001)*** (0.0001) (0.00002)* (0.0001)** (0.0002) (0.0002)
Distance-to-Enemies2
- 1.25E−6
(5.70E−7)**
Distortion-LT-K
- 0.095 0.069 0.045 - 0.263 - 0.373 - 0.590
(0.050)* (0.045) (0.020)** (0.047)*** (0.090)*** (0.128)***
Estimation Fixed Region Effects OLS
R2 0.42 0.75 0.22 0.91 0.71 0.61 0.79
Number of observations 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
Notes: 1. Standard errors allowing for clustering by region in parentheses. *** labels significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
2. We never consider War2 to avoid multicollinearity. In addition, the specifications in columns (2) to (7) also incorporate Sericulture,
Wheat, and Arboriculture.
Table X: Other Measures of Economic Development
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
The dependent variable is:
Agriculture Life Height VAP-F VAP-C VAP-M Pop-Density
War
- 18.614 - 10.401 - 0.292 13.015 8.442 7.583 - 12.827
(10.934) (6.837) (0.289) (7.069)* (16.335) (13.872) (7.810)
War2
507.191 196.782 2.666 - 341.848 - 395.386 - 216.413 262.214
(262.972)* (191.975) (7.931) (186.074)* (445.019) (379.432) (210.424)
Distance-to-Enemies
- 0.0004 - 0.00010 5.66E−7 - 0.0002 - 0.0002 - 0.0002 0.00013
(0.0001)*** (0.00003)** (1.98E−6) (0.0001)*** (0.0001)** (0.0001)** (0.00005)**
Distortion-LT
- 0.095 - 0.074 - 0.003 - 0.096 - 0.166 - 0.276 - 0.097
(0.040)** (0.028)** (0.001)*** (0.030)*** (0.060)** (0.054)*** (0.028)***
Estimation Fixed Region Effects OLS
R2 0.35 0.60 0.73 0.45 0.52 0.69 0.62
Number of observations 78 78 78 78 78 78 78
Notes: 1. Standard errors allowing for clustering by region in parentheses. *** labels significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
2. All specifications also incorporate Sericulture, Wheat, and Arboriculture.
Table XI: Controlling for Time Effects and Medieval Political Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
The dependent variable is:
GDP Culture Illiterates VA-F VA-C VA-M
War
- 43.055 - 30.308 19.051 3.360 - 30.723 - 27.666
(16.493)** (16.023)* (6.038)*** (21.468) (51.605) (29.433)
War2
1820.044 991.646 - 652.611 148.890 1481.681 1224.810
(517.097)*** (502.371)** (189.299)*** (673.063) (1617.923) (922.794)
Distance-to-Enemies
0.00002 - 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 - 0.0002 0.0004
(0.00029) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0005)
Distortion-LT
- 0.010 - 0.034 0.038 - 0.091 0.016 - 0.167
(0.032) (0.031) (0.012)*** (0.042)** (0.100) (0.057)***
P-value for Democracy-M
× 1861-1901 dummies [0.03] [0.19] [0.00] [0.19] [0.18] [0.00]
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Estimation Fixed Region Effects OLS
R2 0.88 0.51 0.95 0.82 0.80 0.93
Number of observations 78 78 78 78 78 78
Notes: 1. Standard errors allowing for clustering by region in parentheses. *** labels significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
2. All specifications also incorporate Sericulture, Wheat, and Arboriculture.
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